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The phenomenon of corporate crime has been of ever-increasing concern to 
academics, legislatures and the judiciary throughout the twentieth century. It 
has been defined by Clinard and Quinney as "the offenses committed by 
corporate officials for their corporation and the offenses of the corporation 
itself"1, although arguably corporations are also liable for the offences their 
agents commit outside the scope of their employment or authority which are 
facilitated by the corporation's organisational negligence2. While many 
corporate crimes occur solely in the financial realm, the law must consider the 
liability of the corporation - which is considered a 'person' - for acts and 
omissions which cause harm to or the death of, for example, its employees or 
consumers.
This paper is concerned with the topical subject of corporate manslaughter; 
despite a cursory dismissal from the authors of one textbook within the last five 
years3, this area of the law has since seen its first conviction, numerous academic 
articles and the publication of a Law Commission Report4 which evidenced a 
"concern, almost amounting to a preoccupation"5 with this particular facet of 
manslaughter.
1 Clinard, M. and Quinney, R. Criminal Behaviour Systems: A Typology (New York: Holt, Rinehart & 
Winston, 1973)
2 Colvin, Eric 'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum (1) 1-44, 
28
3 "No doubt this is one of the many topics which call for systematic research and consideration 
but it is one of the least urgent" - Card, R., Cross, R., and Jones, P. Criminal Law (London, Dublin, 
Edinburgh: Butterworths, 1992), p!70
4 Law Commission Report No. 237 Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (London: 
HMSO, 1996)
5 Wells, Celia 'The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox and Peninsularity' 
[1996] Criminal Law Review 545-553, 545
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In this Introduction, it is hoped to explain the sudden flurry of activity in relation 
to corporate manslaughter which is perhaps most evident in the intensity of the 
Law Commission's attention. Celia Wells notes the significance of the common 
reaction which her use of the phrase 'corporate manslaughter' elicits from those 
with no legal background - "like Zeebrugge you mean"6 - and believes that "[t]he 
trend towards responding to disasters in terms of corporate manslaughter seems 
to have begun with the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise at Zeebrugge in 
1987"7. The spate of high-profile disasters including the capsize of the Herald, the 
Piper Alpha oil rig explosion, and the King's Cross Underground fire has 
focused the attention of both academics and the mainstream media on the 
potential culpability of the organisations responsible for safety in each of those 
situations. Peter Young claims that:
"[m]ost disasters occur through an apparently simple fault in an 
unsophisticated part of a system. That fault, however, is usually 
symptomatic of greater deficiencies: lack of corporate responsibility 
for safety, sheer incompetence, the absence of clear definitions of 
accountability"8.
C.M.V. Clarkson asserts that "[i]nterest in [corporate criminal liability] is the 
result of two sets of developments"9, the first of which is the series of disasters 
mentioned above, and the second of which is "an increased awareness of the 
numbers of persons annually being killed and seriously injured in their places of 
work"10. What these two factors have in common is that the cause of these 
deaths is increasingly attributed to those in positions of corporate responsibility 
or the body corporate itself. A change in attitude must be reflected in the
6 Wells, Celia 'Cry in the Dark: Corporate Manslaughter and Cultural Meaning' in Frontiers of 
Criminality Loveland,Ian (ed.) (London: Sweet & Maxwell, 1995) 109-125,109
7 ibid pi 12
8 Young, Peter Disasters: Focusing on Management Responsibility (London: Herald Families 
Association, 1993) pi




language applied to such situations. Where criminal culpability rests with a 
corporation, then a death is not an 'accident' but a crime. Large scale disasters 
are not necessarily 'acts of God' - James Tye, the director-general of the British 
Safety Council astutely says that "[i]t is no use putting accidents down to acts of 
God. Why does God always pick on badly managed places with sloppy 
practices? He does not seem to pick on well managed places"11.
More than any other single event, the Herald capsize and the findings of the 
subsequent inquiry pointed to a moral culpability on the part of Townsend Car 
Ferries Ltd. (later P&O European Ferries Ltd.) which was completely unreflected 
in the abortive attempts to pin criminal responsibility on the company. The 
circumstances must be outlined.
The Herald left the port of Zeebrugge on 6 March 1987 with its bow doors open. 
Just outside the harbour, the ferry capsized, resulting in the loss of 193 lives. The 
task of ensuring the doors were shut fell to the Assistant Bosun, who was asleep 
in Iris cabin; the Chief Officer failed in his duty to supervise the Assistant Bosun 
in this; the Master was responsible for the ship setting sail with the doors open. 
There was no way in which the Captain could tell from the bridge whether or not 
the doors had been closed. Some degree of fault was also attributed to the Senior 
Master, for the lack of a fail-safe system in this regard. The official inquiry into 
the capsize saw blame attached not only to these immediate causes of the 
tragedy; instead, the Report damningly stated that "a full investigation into the 
circumstances of the disaster leads inexorably to the conclusion that the 
underlying or cardinal faults lay higher up in the Company. The Board of 
Directors did not appreciate their responsibility for the safe management of their 
ships. They did not apply their minds to the question: what orders should be
11 Quoted in 'The Consumer, the Lawyer and the Company', Rodger Pannone, paper presented at 
Consumer Congress 16th Annual Conference, Belfast, 6 April 1991
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given for the safety of our ships? The directors did not have any proper 
comprehension of what their duties were. There appears to have been a lack of 
thought about the way in which the Herald ought to have been organised for the 
Dover/Zeebrugge run. All concerned in management, from members of the 
Board of Directors down to the junior superintendents, were guilty of fault in 
that all must be regarded as sharing responsibility for the failure of management. 
From top to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of 
sloppiness ... The failure on the part of shore management to give proper and 
clear directions was a contributory cause of the disaster"12. It was alleged that 
the directors ignored requests to install indicator lights to alert crew members to 
the possibility of sailing with the bow doors open.
An inquest into the deaths of 188 of the Herald's victims took place in September 
1987 under Kent coroner Richard Sturt. Explaining the possibility of a verdict of 
unlawful killing, Sturt told the jury that they must "be satisfied beyond any 
reasonable doubt that the act or omission by an individual caused, subsequently, 
one or more of the deaths and that the individual was guilty of gross 
negligence"13. The coroner found that a corporate body could not, as a matter of 
law, be guilty of manslaughter, that the aggregation of acts and omissions of 
individual corporate agents could not be used to find fault in the corporation 
itself, and that the acts and omissions of Townsend Car Ferries Ltd. were not the 
direct cause of the deaths14. As Celia Wells notes, there is an essential 
contradiction here in the way "[ijnquest juries are told both that they are not 
concerned with criminal liability and that they are to reach a conclusion about
12 Department of Transport, Public Inquiry, Report of Ct. No. 8074, para. 14.1, p!4 (London: 
HMSO, 1987)
13 Quoted in Crainer, Stuart Zeebrugge: Learning from Disaster (London: Herald Charitable Trust, 
1993) See R v. West London Coroner, ex. p. Gray [1987] 2 WLR 1020
14 Keenan, Denis 'Corporate Manslaughter' (1988) 102(1140) Accountancy 108
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how the deceased came to die"15. An application for leave to apply for judicial 
review of the coroner's findings was rejected, but the Court tentatively accepted 
the possibility of a corporate manslaughter conviction16. Despite the cautious 
approach of the coroner, the jury was evidently convinced on the criminal 
standard of proof, and brought in a verdict of unlawful killing. As a result, the 
Director of Public Prosecutions ordered a criminal investigation into the capsize. 
In June of 1989, manslaughter summonses were issued against P&O European 
Ferries (Dover) and seven of its employees.
Academic reaction was a cautious welcome - the prosecution of a corporation, 
and the accompanying shift in public perception away from the stereotypes of 
'traditional' crime, was well received, but the limitations of corporate criminal 
liability detailed below in Chapters Three and Four presented obvious problems. 
Additional concern was voiced because "[i]t has been clear since the inquest into 
the drownings, that the relatives were keen to see the company properly 
punished but not the particular individuals whose misfortune it was to be 
operating the ferry that March night. The prosecution of a number of 
individuals at all levels might distract from a consideration of the proper basis of 
corporate liability for criminal offences"17.
After 27 days, the case collapsed. Turner J directing the jury to find the company 
and the five most senior employees charged not guilty. The prosecution 
promptly dropped its charges against the two remaining defendants, a decision 
which accorded with the wishes of the relatives not to see junior employees 
scapegoated when greater fault was present throughout the corporation. A week 
before the end of the trial the judge ruled that there was "no evidence that
is Wells, Celia 'Inquests, Inquiries and Indictments: The Official Reception of Death by Disaster' 
(1991) 11 Legal Studies 71-84,76
16 H.M. Coroner for East Kent ex parte Spoo?ier (1989) 88 Cr. App. R. 10
17 Wells, Celia 'Manslaughter and Corporate Crime' (1989) 139 New Law Journal 931-934, 931
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reasonably prudent marine superintendents, chief superintendents, or naval 
architects, would or should have recognised that the system gave rise to an 
obvious and serious risk of open-door sailing"18. The main reason for this 
finding was evidence that ships had sailed safely using the system in question 
over 60000 times, for over seven years. But as Wells notes "an approach to risk 
assessment based only on frequency of past occurrence is simplistic. It is 
reminiscent of the small child who, having survived crossing a road without 
looking, disputes the risk involved in such a strategy with the statement 'But it 
was safe: I didn't get run over'"19.
The very failures of communication which had resulted in the drownings 
allowed the company to escape liability. The Crown contested that because of 
five previous incidents in which ferries had sailed with the doors open, the 
system operating was obviously inadequate, and the shore management should 
have known this. And yet because four of the five incidents were not brought to 
the attention of any of the defendants (the fifth, seen by one of them, was 
immediately dealt with20), the company could not be fixed with responsibility for 
failure to amend its procedures. The derivative nature of corporate criminal 
liability, which is parasitic on proof of individual criminal liability, is starkly 
discredited by the facts of the P&O case.
18 supra n!3 pi 01
19 Wells, Celia 'Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability' [1993] Criminal Law Review 551-566, 554. The 
risk which should have been considered, however, was the risk of harm, not of sailing with open 
doors.
20 Bergman, David 'Recklessness in the Boardroom' (1990) Nero Law Journal 1496
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WORKPLACE FATALITIES
Between 1983 and 1992/93, there were 5774 reported cases of employees, self- 
employed people and members of the public killed in workplace incidents21. 
David Bergman believes that "[m]ost of these deaths are unnecessary and easily 
preventable. According to the Health and Safety Executive (HSE) over 70% of 
workplace deaths are the fault of management and their failure to organise and 
co-ordinate safe systems of work, to inform workers of hazards, and provide 
them with proper training and instruction"22.
The investigation of workplace deaths falls to the HSE, which is concerned with 
violations of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act (HSWA) 1974. It claims that 
suitable cases for prosecution of such crimes as manslaughter will be referred fo 
the police, but as Gary Slapper noted in 1992, "[sjince 1974, when the HSE was 
established, there have been 9050 deaths at work yet the HSE cannot point to a 
single case which it has referred to the CPS"23. Prosecutions are for failure to 
comply with a duty set out in the Act24 - the seriousness of the consequences is 
irrelevant to the issue of guilt. Therefore, regulatory offences under the 1974 Act 
are generally punished with fines which can be insignificant in relation to the 
size of the company convicted25. No offence under the 1974 Act is triable only on 
indictment, and so it is left "to the discretion of the magistrate to decide whether
21 Health and Safety Commission Annual Report 1992/93 (London: HMSO, 1993) It is estimated 
that a mere one-sixth of workplace 'accidents' are reported to the authorities, although for 
1993/94, there were 28,924 serious injuries due to violent incidents reported - Health and Safety 
Commission Annual Report 1993/94 (London: HMSO, 1994)
22 Bergman, David Deaths At Work: Accidents or Corporate Crime (London: Workers' Educational 
Association, 1991) p3
23 Slapper, Gary 'Crime Without Conviction' (1992) New Law journal 192-193,192
24 General duties in respect of the health and safety of employees and others are set out in s2 and 
s3 respectively. For each, the maximum penalty is an unlimited fine (£20,000 on summary 
conviction): HSWA Act 1974, s33(l A) (as amended by the Offshore Safety Act 1992)
25 Bergman, David The Perfect Crime?: How Companies Escape Manslaughter Prosecution (London: 
Workers' Educational Association, 1994) pi 02
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or not the case should be prosecuted in the Crown Court"26, even where a death 
has occurred. The maximum fine in the magistrates' courts is £20,000.
Bergman notes that, traditionally, "police investigation signifies the first step in 
defining certain activity as criminal"27. In contrast to traditional violent crime, 
however, "crimes of corporate violence rarely attract any investigation at all. In 
the few instances where investigations do occur, they will be carried out by a 
non-police inspectorate (e.g. the HSE) chiefly concerned with regulation"28. As 
well as the problem of insufficient resources faced by regulatory agencies, 
Bergman contends that "[t]he lack of police investigation allows inspecting 
agencies to undertake less thorough investigations, and magistrates and judges 
to sentence more leniently. The displacement of the police is therefore both a 
real and symbolic first step in the decriminalisation of corporate conduct and its 
marginalisation from effective sanction through the criminal justice system"29. 
Wells, too, argues for deaths at work to be subject to full police investigation, 
noting that:
"[i]t is the very existence of separate agencies which contributes to the 
marginalisation of these deaths and injuries from the glare of criminal 
enforcement ... Industry crime is not brought within the current definitions 
of crime (murder, manslaughter and so on) and where specific offences are 
drawn, such as pollution and health and safety laws, they are policed 
separately and set apart from 'ordinary' crime by their own system of 
regulation"30.
Attitudes to corporate crime in the workplace may, however, be changing - the 
first company director to be disqualified as a result of an offence under health 
and safety law lost his position in June 1992. Rodney Chapman was prosecuted
26 ibid pi 03
27 Bergman, David Disasters - Where the Law Fails: A New Agenda for Dealing with Corporate Violence 
(London: Herald Families Association, 1993) p43
28 ibid p43
29 ibid p47
so Wells, Celia 'The Decline and Rise of English Murder' [1988] Criminal Law Review 788
under s37 of the HSWA 1974 as the director of a company which, with his 
consent, connivance or due to his negligence, contravened a prohibition notice31. 
This may signal a welcome new focus on the individual responsibility of senior 
management, but as with the P&O case above, there are larger issues of 
corporate fault than such an approach can accommodate. For this reason, too, 
this paper examines the possibility of reform in the area of corporate 
manslaughter.
Chapter One raises the question of whether the prosecution and punishment of a 
corporation can be justified philosophically - what is it that we seek to 
accomplish by doing so? The justifications for the punishment of individuals are 
therefore examined, and in the latter part of the chapter, applied to the corporate 
context. The following two chapters are devoted to exposition of the important 
background information which underlies consideration of corporate 
manslaughter. Chapter Two explains the development of the law of 
manslaughter as it applies to all persons, natural or corporate; Chapter Three 
deals with the evolution of principles of corporate liability for crime generally, 
and manslaughter in particular.
From this point, the focus switches to the potential for improvement of the 
current system of liability laid out in the previous chapters - Chapter Four looks 
at some of the alternative schemes of liability which have emerged in the 
academic literature on the topic, and is followed in Chapter Five by an 
exploration of the approaches adopted in several other jurisdictions to see what 
lessons can be learnt from the use of alternative schemes in practice. The concern 
of Chapter Six is with the problem of effective punishment of corporations; 
again, the possibility of broadening the range of sanctions available to improve 
the productiveness of corporate punishment is that chapter's main consideration.
31 Slapper, Gary 'Where the Buck Stops' (1992) New Law Journal 1037-1038,1037
Finally, Chapter Seven provides an explanation and discussion of the Law 
Commission's recent proposals for a new crime of corporate killing.
As our attitude to 'accident' and 'disaster' changes, and the concepts of risk and 
blame increase in significance to our perception of corporate activity, the law 
must adapt as well. This paper considers the most effective and accurate way in 
which the law can reflect the culpability of corporations for unlawfully causing 
death.
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CHAPTER ONE: THE PHILOSOPHY OF
CORPORATE PUNISHMENT
Before launching into an examination of the law of corporate manslaughter, it is 
necessary to test the solidity of the philosophical foundation on which that law is 
based. The question in issue is simple - is the criminal law an appropriate system 
for dealing with the misdemeanours of corporate actors? This chapter provides 
first an extensive examination of the justifications which are advanced for 
punishment generally, and then seeks to apply those justifications, if possible, to 
the corporate context.
1USTIFICATIONS OF PUNISHMENT
Michael Lessnoff notes that "[hjistorically, two major, and conflicting, 
justifications for punishment have been suggested - the retributive theory and 
the utilitarian theory"1. The utilitarian justification subdivides to include the 
benefits of deterrence, incapacitation and rehabilitation; the respective 
importance placed on each of these varies with the prevailing philosophy of the 
criminal justice system, but all play some part in the justification of punishment.
Retribution revolves around the notion that the criminal is punished because she 
has done wrong - the punishment is deserved and is an end in itself. The opposing 
view is that punishment is justified only in its promotion of the greater good. 
This may suggest a consequentialist determination to achieve a goal at any price, 
giving rise to definite moral problems; "if it is the desirable consequences of 
punishment that justify it, and not the fact that the victim has committed a wrong 
act, why not, on appropriate occasions, punish an innocent man, pretending that
1 Lessnoff, Michael 'Two Justifications of Punishment' (1971) 21 Philosophical Quarterly 141-148, 
141
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he is guilty, if the desirable consequences can be brought about thereby?"2. 
However, the retributive and utilitarian theories may be employed together - in 
this way, punishment is imposed because of its utilitarian benefits, and in an 
amount dependent on the desert of the criminal being punished. Therefore, by 
limiting punishment to the maximum deserved, such a dilemma is 
circumnavigated.
RETRIBUTION
The part played in punishment by notions of retribution is repugnant to many 
liberals, but nonetheless cannot be ignored. It can be seen in the retaliatory 
sentiment of the earliest known system of laws, the Code of Hammurabi, which 
had as its ruling principle the lex talionis - an eye for an eye, a tooth for a tooth3 - 
although unlike retaliation, retribution involves the concept of fault. It is 
embedded deeply in human psychology; William Me Dougal claims that it 
"arises naturally from the doctrine of free will ... according to this assumption, 
where human action is concerned, the future course of events is not determined 
by the present". Therefore, "punishment cannot be administered in the forward- 
looking attitude with a view to deterrence or to moral improvement, but only in 
the backward-looking vengeful attitude of retribution"4. Such thinking has 
given rise to the idea that perhaps "as a society we are not yet prepared to 
abandon the retributionary element in criminal justice and that, if sentences are 
thought to be derisible, something akin to lynch law may arise. Courts may, 
therefore have a therapeutic duty for the present to appease the retributionary 
instinct in man until we are ready to discard it"5.
2ibid pi 42
3 Gibbons, Don C. Society, Crime and Criminal Behaviour (Eaglewood Cliffs, NJ: Prentice Hall, 1992) 
p463
4 McDougal, William Social Psychology (Methuen, 1908) pH
5 James, Leslie 'In Search of Justice: Retribution or Deterrence?' (1992) Justice of the Peace 488-489, 
488
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Obviously, such a theory flies in the face of the utilitarian philosophy 
underpinning the justification of punishment for reasons of deterrence, 
incapacitation or rehabilitation. Kleinig notes that "in many contemporary 
discussions of punishment, there has been a tendency to regard [non-utilitarian 
considerations] as impulses or feelings belonging to our lower, non-rational 
nature, primitive desires for revenge"6. That may indeed be so; but a criminal 
justice system that willingly blindfolds itself to undesirable non-rational 
elements in the human psyche risks greater danger than one which 
acknowledges such factors. It is necessary to account for a desire for retribution 
which, whether welcome or not, can always be understood.
Several elements are included in the concept of retribution - a degree of revenge, 
as noted above; an old-fashioned, religiously founded idea of expiation7, 
whereby the offender is purified of his guilt by the punishment; and also the 
dominant element of just desert for the crime committed. Von Hirsch sets out 
the philosophy of just deserts as follows -
"A useful place to begin is with Kant's explanation of deserved 
punishment, which he based on the idea of fair dealing among free 
individuals. To realise their own freedom, he contended, members 
of society have the reciprocal obligation to limit their behaviour so 
as not to interfere with the freedom of others. When someone 
infringes another's rights, he gains an unfair advantage over all 
others in the society - since he has failed to constrain his own 
behaviour while benefiting from other persons' forbearance from 
interfering with his rights. The punishment - by imposing a 
counterbalancing disadvantage on the violator - restores the
6 Kleinig, John Punishment and Desert (The Hague, Martinus Nijhoff, 1973) p49
7See Clarkson, C.M.V. and Keating, H.M. Criminal Law: Text and Materials (London: Sweet &
Maxwell, 1994) pp. 25-26
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equilibrium: after having undergone the punishment, the violator 
ceases to be at an advantage over his non-violating fellows"8.
Since Kant, desert theorists have claimed that by punishing wrongdoers for 
breaking the law, we accord them "respect as autonomous and responsible 
human beings who have chosen to commit a crime"9. On the other hand, "to be 
punished for reform reasons is to be treated like a dog"10.
Just deserts theory has come under some criticism for a supposedly unrealistic 
understanding of the concepts of "burden" and "freedom". Casting doubt on the 
self-restraint truly required to avoid committing, for example, murder, 
Braithwaite and Pettit allege that "some burdens have practical significance for 
people and some do not"* 11. Therefore, they claim, the renunciation of these 
"burdens" is insufficient reason for the imposition of criminal liability. What this 
line of argument fails to recognise is that the less significant a burden is, the more 
deserving of punishment is he who fails to observe it. The temptation to drop an 
empty wrapper when no bin is in sight may be great, and the individual act may 
appear to do no real harm; it is for this reason a significant burden not to litter in 
this case, requiring remembrance of a social contract and the potential result 
should everyone decide that their one little wrapper couldn't cause much of a 
problem.
Clarkson and Keating conclude that just deserts theory has two main advantages 
as a justification for retributive punishment. Firstly, state power is subject to 
limits which prevent the imposition of excessive sentences for exemplary or
8 Von Hirsch, Andrew Doing Justice - The Choice of Punishments (Report of the Committee for the 
Study of Incarceration) (1976) p49. See also Murphy, Jeffrie Retribution, Justice and Therapy 
(Dodrecht, London: Reidel, 1979)
9 supra n7, p27
10 Mabbott, J. 'Freewill and Punishment' (1956) Contemporary British Philosophy 289, 303
11 Braithwaite, John & Pettit, Philip Not Just Deserts: A Republican Theory of Criminal Justice (Oxford: 
Clarendon Press, 1990) p!59
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incapacitative reasons - a notion supported by C.S. Lewis, who claimed that "the 
concept of Desert is the only connecting link between punishment and justice"12. 
The second major advantage of just deserts punishment is the creation of a level 
sentencing structure, where a crime merits a certain punishment irrespective of 
the race, religion, nationality or background of the criminal in question13.
Before leaving the topic of retribution, attention should be drawn to the 
importance of censure to the criminal system - Clarkson and Keating14 use the 
example of the Sutcliffe15 trial, at which the defendant's plea of guilty to 
manslaughter was acceptable to the prosecution but rejected by the judge, who 
insisted on an expensive public trial which resulted in a murder conviction. The 
same sentence of life imprisonment could have been imposed as a result of a 
manslaughter conviction, but the publicity and stigma of a murder conviction 
were obviously deemed to be both desirable and necessary for the criminal 
process to have dealt adequately with this offender. This is important evidence 
in favour of the contention that "[pjunishment declares that this society will not 
tolerate this conduct, regardless of any future deterrent effect ... The most 
important aim of the denunciatory theory ... is to reassure the majority of society 
that the system does work"16. Lawton L.J. in Sargent17 strongly appealed for an 
understanding that "society, through the courts, must show its abhorrence of 
particular types of crime, and the only way in which the courts can show this is 
by the sentences they pass. The courts do not have to reflect public opinion. On 
the other hand courts must not disregard it"18.
12 Lewis, C.S. 'The Humanitarian Theory of Punishment' (1953) VI Res Judicatae 224
13 Supra n7, p32
14 ibid
15 The Times, April 30,1981: The Times, May 23,1981
16 Rychlak, Ronald J. 'Society's Moral Right to Punish: A Further Exploration of the Denunciation 
Theory of Punishment' (1990-91) 65 Tulane Law Review 299, 331-332




Deterrence splits into two categories - individual deterrence, whereby the 
criminal's tendency to criminal acts is overborne by the fear of punishment; and 
general deterrence, which lets the punishment of one be a warning to all. 
Punishment, according to Hobbes' definition is "an Evill inflicted by publique 
Authority on him that hath done, ommitted that which is judged by the same 
Authority to be a Transgression of the Law; to the end that the will of men may 
the better be disposed to obedience"19. Montaigne, too, favours general 
deterrence and dismisses retribution as a justification for punishment, noting that
"[i]t is a custom of our justice to punish some as a warning to others. For 
to punish them for having done wrong would, as Plato says, be stupid: what 
is done cannot be undone. The intention is to stop them from repeating the 
same mistake or to make others avoid their error. We do not improve the 
man we hang: we improve others by him"20.
Montaigne's focus on the crime as a "mistake" or "error" displays the 
irreconcilability of his view with that of Kant, for whom the crime must be a 
rational human choice, or we deprive humanity of autonomy. This is the first 
problem with deterrence as a justification for punishment - the fact that human 
beings, irrespective of our wishes, are not wholly rational creatures. As 
mentioned in the consideration of revenge as an aspect of retribution, it may on 
occasion be a necessary function of the law to "encourage the imposition of 
public vengeance as a substitute for private vengeance"21. The efficacy of 
deterrence is also problematic - the persuasiveness of the deterrence argument is 
weakened by every crime committed; considerably so, in the case of every 
repeat offence22.
19 Hobbes, T. Leviathan, Everyman edn. (London: J.M. Dent, 1914), p!64
20 Montaigne, Michel de 'On the Art of Conversation' The Complete Works of Montaigne (London: 
Hamish Hamilton, 1958)
21 Stannard, Dr. John E. (Queen's University, Belfast) Punishment and Public Relations Unpublished
22 supra n7, p35
19
The case for deterrence as a justification for punishment is put forward by 
Hyman Gross as follows:
"the rules of conduct laid down in the criminal law are a powerful 
social force upon which society is dependent for its very existence, 
and there is punishment for znolation of these rules in order to prevent the 
dissipation of their power that would result if they were violated with 
impunity"23.
That dissipation of power can be illustrated quite dramatically. Clarkson and 
Keating use the example of what they call "petty white-collar crime"24 in the 
workplace - using an office telephone for private phone calls beyond those 
permitted by an employer could result in up to five years' imprisonment25, but 
the lack of enforcement of this law has led to a breakdown in the understanding 
of such an act as criminal. Office workers see no practical effect of the 
commission of this 'forbidden' act, and so no longer consider it forbidden. 
Without the educative deterrence of an unpleasant consequence (to oneself or 
another) the act loses its wrongful quality.
This educative role, some claim, goes further than simply preventing citizens 
from engaging in criminal acts for fear of being caught and punished. "The idea 
is that punishment as a concrete expression of society's disapproval of an act 
helps to form and to strengthen the public's moral code and thereby creates 
conscious and unconscious inhibitions against committing crime". More than 
this, "[t]o the lawmaker, the achievement of inhibition and habit is of greater 
value than mere deterrence. For these apply in cases, where a person need not
23 Gross, Hyman A Theory of Criminal Justice (New York: Oxford University Press, 1979) p401 
(emphasis added)
24 supra n7, p40
25 Theft Act (NI) 1969 s!3
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fear detection and punishment, and they can apply without the person even 
having knowledge of the legal prohibition"26.
From the White Paper which preceded the Criminal Justice Act 1991, it emerges 
clearly that deterrence is not looked upon as the most important justification for 
punishment in the current criminal justice system. It was said therein that it is 
"unrealistic to construct sentencing arrangements on the assumption that most 
offenders will weigh up the possibilities in advance and base their conduct on 
rational calculation"27. This may be the case, but it ignores the possibility, 
outlined above, of conscious and unconscious inhibitions playing a role in the 
decision-making of a potential criminal. Deterrence is therefore not necessarily 
at the forefront of punishment justification, but its part may be significant, 
particularly in tandem with one or more of the other proposed justifications.
INCAPACITATION
One utilitarian benefit which accrues from punishment is that of incapacitation - 
prevention, for a time, of the possibility of the offender repeating his crime. This 
is arguably justified because, in the words of Lawton L.J., "there are some 
offenders for whom neither deterrence nor rehabilitation works. They will go on 
committing crimes as long as they are able to do so. In those cases the only 
protection which the public has is that such persons should be locked up for a 
long period"28. Immediately, however, grave ethical problems arise. How can it 
be predicted with accuracy that a criminal will reoffend? Von Hirsch claims that 
incapacitation is incompatible with the desert model of punishment because 
"[t]he use of predictions, accurate or not, [means] that those identified as future
26 Andenaes, J. 'General Prevention' (1952) Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology & Police Science 
176,179-181
27 Crime, justice and Protecting the Public (1990) Cm.965, para.2.8
28 supra n!7, pp77-78
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recidivists [will] be treated more severely than those not so identified, not 
because of differences in the blameworthiness of their past conduct, but because 
of crimes they supposedly would commit in future"29.
Two principles were used in the Floud Report on Dangerous Offenders30 to 
assess the problem of punishment on grounds of predicted recidivism. The first 
is that of just redistribution of risk31 - the risk of harm should the criminal 
reoffend must be weighed against the risk of imposing an incapacitative sentence 
which is not, in fact, required. The second principle is the right of citizens in a 
free society to be presumed free of harmful intentions32.
The first of these is a classic utilitarian balancing of risks; the second sees the 
right of the individual as a trump. Hence the topic of prevention as a 
justification for punishment is, as are so many dilemmas of morality, a 
straightforward rights-versus-utilitarianism debate. The Floud Report proposed 
a statutory framework for protective sentencing, with certain restrictions limiting 
the eligibility of offenders for such sentences. The restrictions included the 
requirements that such a sentence should be imposed only in the face of a risk of 
'grave harm' from the offender, in a situation where there is no other possible 
way of providing the public with the necessary protection from that harm.
An accommodation between protective sentencing and principles of retribution 
has been sought; Ashworth notes that "[i]n general, ... persistent offenders are 
more blameworthy because they have lost all trace of mitigating circumstances - 
they know the law only too well, they know what they can expect if caught
29 Von Hirsch, Andrew Past or Future Crimes (1985), pH




offending, and it is no isolated lapse"33. Proportionality, however, remains 
central to fair sentencing, and the repetition of a petty offence does not justify the 
imposition of a type of sentence which would have been inappropriate on the 
first occasion. Clarkson and Keating claim that literature on the subject of 
prediction "is in broad agreement that for every three persons predicted to 
commit violent offences, only one will do so"34. They conclude that the 
utilitarian argument "fails to convince those who believe that punishment should 
be based upon retributive principles ... [and therefore] the search to defend 
protective sentencing on desert grounds continues to be the only way 
forward"35.
REHABILITATION
Deterrence operates by inducing a fear of conviction and punishment in the 
potential offender. But there is a different approach to the challenge of securing 
compliance with the law; an approach which treats the criminal not as beyond 
redemption, but as a human being with correctable flaws. The idea is that of 
"improving [the offender's] ... character so that he is less often inclined to commit 
offences again even when he can do so without fear of the penalty"36. It is a goal 
which is summarily dismissed by some - Nietzsche observed that "punishment 
tames man, but does not make him better"37, and Horace Mann that "[t]he object 
of punishment is, prevention from evil; it can never be made impulsive to 
good"38. However for a time the goal of rehabilitation was of considerable
33 Ashworth, Andrew Sentencing and Penal Policy (London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1983) p211
34 supra n7, p50
35 ibid, pp51-52
36 Walker, N. 'Punishing, Denouncing or Reducing Crime' in Glazebrook, P. (ed.) Reshaping the 
Criminal Law (London: Stevens, 1978) p393
37 Nietzsche, F. Genealogy of Morals (New York: Vintage Books, 1967) Essay 2, Aphorism 5
38 Mann, Horace Lectures and Reports on Education (1845) 1867 edn.. Lecture
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importance in penal thinking, and should not be brushed over without some 
scrutiny.
Methods of rehabilitation have developed considerably from a starting-point 
dependent on the eighteenth century belief that the punishment itself would 
produce reform - time for contemplation, it was thought, would lead through 
remorse to a resolution to abide by the law in future39. Punishment should 
produce an improved person, not simply remove a Kantian advantage by the 
repayment of a debt owed to the other signatories of a notional social contract. 
With this in mind, probation seeks to modify the social conscience of the 
offender, a goal which heavily influences the sentencing of theoretically receptive 
juvenile offenders. Later, the procedures adopted included psychotherapy and 
environmental or social therapy, as secular and scientific theories replaced moral 
and religious concerns as the dominant modes of thought of the twentieth 
century. This almost medical approach to the disease of crime has not, of course, 
proven to be entirely successful, although it has been claimed that the application 
of rehabilitative procedures to offenders has not been as efficient as it could be - 
" [programs are applied indiscriminately to heterogeneous groups of offenders, 
some of whom may be responsive while others are not ... It is, they say, like 
using insulin to treat all diseases"40.
Sentencing to bring about a reformative effect, while obviously an issue 
requiring significant expertise, remains an inaccurate science. It is also a grave 
concern that the principle of treating like cases alike could be sacrificed to the 
necessity of imposing a sentence which may bring about the desired effect in the 
offender in question.
39 Beccara, Bentham, Eden and Romilly are regarded by Clarkson and Keating as "[t]he great 
penal reformers of the eighteenth century" (supra n7, p52); all prescribed a penal philosophy 
resting on a combination of deterrence and reform.
40 Supra n7, pp!6-18
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Ultimately, the success of the rehabilitative ideal is to be viewed pessimistically - 
Walter Bailey, who examined studies of correctional outcome published between 
1940 and 1960, concluded that "evidence supporting the efficacy of correctional 
treatment is slight, inconsistent, and of questionable reliability"41, while an 
examination of 231 treatment projects conducted between 1946 and 1967 
reported that "with few and isolated exceptions, the rehabilitative efforts that have been 
reported so far have had no appreciable effect on recidivism"42.
The voice of reason on this topic is perhaps most clearly heard in two principles 
which Morris and Howard identify as the basis of their belief that reformative 
advantages should, if possible, be sought, but only in a system which keeps the 
rights of the offenders in the forefront of its thinking. The first of these is that 
"power over a criminal's life should not be taken in excess of that which would be taken 
were his reform not considered as one of our purposes"43, and the second that 
"correctional practices must cease to rest on surmise and good intentions: they must be 
based on facts"44. It should never be forgotten that "[t]he jailer in a white coat 
with a degree in a behavioural science remains a jailer"45.
TUSTIFICATIONS FOR THE PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS
Just as the substantive criminal law developed on the now out-dated assumption 
that all offenders were individuals, the philosophical justifications for 
punishment which have developed in parallel may be inapplicable in a corporate
41 Bailey, Walter C. 'An Evaluation of 100 Studies of Correctional Outcome' (1966) 57 Journal of 
Criminal Law, Criminology and Police Science 153-160,158
42 Martinson, Robert 'What Works? Questions and Answers about Prison Reform' (1974) 35 Public 
Interest 22-54, 25 (emphasis in the original)





context. Above all else, the criminal law seeks to provide a cogent and consistent 
body of rules by which an individual can live, and principles of individualism 
therefore inform the entire criminal law. The pervasiveness of this philosophical 
basis is such that the notion of a corporation committing a crime and thereby 
deserving punishment strikes many people as inherently odd - unnatural, 
almost46. Conditioning is so extensive that there is a reluctance to import the 
"corporateness of corporate action and corporate responsibility"47 into the 
traditional individualistic criminal law. Where an individual is at fault, there is 
no suggestion that they should not be prosecuted; the issue arising here is 
whether, in cases of genuinely corporate wrongdoing, the punishment of the 
corporation itself can be justified.
Saltzburg claims that "a conviction of the corporation itself may substantially 
advance one or more of the traditional purposes of the criminal law"48. A similar 
hope is evident in a publication produced by the Herald Families Association49, 
in which David Bergman states that there are three objectives to the criminal 
justice system - punishment, deterrence and rehabilitation50. His conclusion is 
that "[i]n practice, only the aim of punishment, particularly through the sentence 
of imprisonment, appears to be unambiguously served by the criminal justice
46 "Contemporary preoccupation with the notion that responsibility derives from and attaches to 
the autonomous individual renders us bereft of conceptual tools with which to confront corporate 
liability", according to Celia Wells Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon 
Press, 1993)
47 Brent Fisse & John Braithwaite 'The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability' (1988) Sydney Law Review 468,476
48 Saltzburg, Stephen A. 'The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organizations' (1991) 71 Boston 
University Law Review (2) 421-438, 425
49 Created following the capsize of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry off Zeebrugge on 6th 
March 1987
50 By 'punishment' he means a combination of renunciation and retribution; the civil courts, with 
their goal of reparation, do not provide the symbolic message of censure which accompanies a 
criminal conviction.
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system"51, but that corporations may be more malleable than individuals in 
terms of deterrence and rehabilitation.
Wells argues that the criminal law must play a role in shaping the behaviour of 
corporate bodies because traditional sources of social control which exert an 
influence on individuals - parents, school, religion - do not affect corporations52. 
This is a solid basic justification for the involvement of the law, but a more 
specific focus is required to determine the effectiveness with which the goals of 
deterrence, retribution, incapacitation and rehabilitation are met. Saltzburg 
believes that "[pjrosecuting a corporation can serve at least some of the 
traditional setencing purposes. For example, a court can impose a fine that 
reflects the seriousness of the offense. An appropriate fine may promote 
corporate respect for the law, and may provide just punishment for the offense. 
Additionally, prosecuting a corporation may deter future corporate criminal 
activity"53.
He touches here upon several of the major justifications for corporate 
punishment - not only Wells' underlying social regulation theory, but also 
deterrence, censure and just desert. It is proposed in this section to examine the 
effectiveness with which the proposed goals of punishment may be achieved in 
relation to corporations.
Desert punishment for corporations is resisted vigorously by Braithwaite, who 
claims that "because there is no meaningful equilibrium or reciprocity between 
individuals and corporations, there is no philosophical basis for calculating a
51 Bergman, David Disasters - Where the Law Fails: A Neu> Agenda for Dealing with Corporate Violence 
(London: Herald Families Association, 1993)
52 supra n46, pp. 16-17
53 supra n48, p423
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proportional punishment which would restore equilibrium"54. However, if the 
notion of equilibrium is accepted in relation to individuals, it is just as valid 
between different types of person - human and corporate. While claiming only 
to be concerned with the operation of just desert philosophy in the area of 
corporate crime, Braithwaite's dismissive view of Kant's notion of levelling 
illegally gained social advantage displays a distaste for the underpinning theory. 
The conclusion may be reached that for those who advocate deserved 
punishment for individuals, it can be justified for corporations.
Braithwaite does recognise that for those "retributivists who eschew the niceties 
of Kantian or Aristotelean justifications for retribution", the corporation is just as 
appropriate a target for revenge as the individual55.
In 1970, the Law Commission published a Working Paper which stated that:
"The objective in ... [industrial accident cases] ... is not merely to induce the 
firm to take remedial action, for in many cases in which prosecutions are 
taken the accident is itself sufficient for this purpose. The firm is being 
punished for its failure to take action before the accident, rather than its 
subsequent failure to comply with the requests of the Inspectorate. The 
purpose of such prosecution from the enforcement angle is thus to make it 
clear to the individual employer and to employers at large that where a 
firm has failed to protect the life and limbs of employees ... a penal sanction 
will be imposed. The rationale is that of special and general deterrence 
rather than administrative enforcement"56.
This reasoning follows that of Edwin Sutherland, who claimed that "[t]he 
corporation probably comes closer to the 'economic man' and 'pure reason' than 
any other person or other organisation. The executives and directors not only
54 Braithwaite, John 'Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals' 73 Journal of 
Criminal Law & Criminology (2) 723, at 731
55 ibid p731
56 Bergman, David Disasters - Where the Law Fails: A New Agenda for Dealing with Corporate Violence 
(London: Herald Families Association, 1993)
28
have explicit and consistent objectives of maximum pecuniary gain but also have 
research and accounting departments by which precise determination of results 
is facilitated"57. Therefore the financial implications of any legal infringement 
can be weighed, and the risk rejected if the potential cost outstrips the potential 
profit. In this way, the possibility of a fine serves a significant deterrent effect. 
There is opposing academic opinion - Dunford and Ridley note that this 
approach "does not take into account the fact that in the corporate context, 
decisions are often made collectively and that there is some evidence that 
managers tend to make riskier decisions when acting in groups than when acting 
individuallv"58.
j
Incapacitation as a justification for corporate punishment is certainly valid - if a 
corporation cannot observe its obligations it may be curtailed from causing 
harm, but the practical problem of incapacitating a company makes this 
justification somewhat academic. Corporations can dissolve and then reconvene 
under a different name, or with an altered board of directors. There is therefore 
the difficulty that "a corporate conviction [does not] helpfully forewarn the 
public since it is unlikely that a [crime] would be repeated under the same 
corporate flag"59. An incapacitation of sorts as punishment - for example, 
exclusion from government contracts - may nonetheless operate as an effective 
deterrent. One major problem is that the practical effect of incapacitative 
punishment of corporations may be suffering imposed on innocent employees 
who lose work despite never being at fault. However, this problem of overspill 
is of concern when the effectiveness of corporate punishment is being 
considered60. Its justification on philosophical grounds is unaffected.
57 Sutherland, Edwin White Collar Crime (New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1983)
58 Dunford, Louise & Ridley, Ann '"No Soul to be Damned, No Body to be Kicked" [1] 
Responsibility, Blame and Corporate Punishment' (1996) 24 International Journal of the Sociology of 
Law 1-19,10
59 Andrews, John 'Reform in the Law of Corporate Liability' [1973] Criminal Law Review 91, 94
60 See Chapter Six belcrw
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It is also important to look at the potential for rehabilitation in the corporate 
sphere. Any rehabilitation which results from a corporate crime conviction will 
be of value only if it focuses on the organisational structure which caused the 
commission of the offence rather than the individual or individuals who 
committed it. To concentrate on the individual at fault will have no "significant 
impact on institutional or structural offences that result from intraorganisational 
performance pressures or bureaucratic failures"61. Unless change goes to the 
heart of, for example, the company's standard operating procedures, the danger 
remains that offences will recur, perhaps even repeated by those who replace the 
individuals guilty of the original failures. This possibility is noted by Dunford 
and Ridley62, who believe that the most powerful force for organisational change 
in the case of serious corporate crime is the media coverage and accompanying 
public attention - they cite the example of the conviction of OLL Ltd. following 
the Lyme Bay canoeing disaster as a legal judgement which received relatively 
little news coverage, but which led, in large part through the outrage over the 
tragedy itself, to the introduction of the Activity Centres (Young Persons' Safety) 
Act 199563.
While this public outrage is a force for rehabilitative change, it is also indicative 
of society's need to publicly declare its condemnation of criminal behaviour. On 
this point, Ridley and Dunford note that "[i]f the underlying reason for 
prosecution is to signify the moral condemnation of society, then despite the fact 
that change may be brought about by factors outside the criminal law, the true 
justification for punishment in the corporate context may include retribution as 
well as deterrence, and the moral justice requirement that all companies should
61 Metzger, M.B. & Schwenk, C.R. 'Decision making models, devil's advocacy and the control of 
corporate crime' (1990) 28 American Business Law Journal 323-377, 335
62 supra n57, p5
63 ibid p6 Private Member's Bill
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be equally answerable before the law"64. And while they express an opinion that 
current sentencing policy falls short of these goals, they come to the important 
conclusion that "it is no argument to say that corporations should not be 
punished because current sanctions are ineffective. This confuses two separate 
issues: namely, the justification for punishment and the selection of an 
appropriate and effective sanction"65.
As in the case of individual punishment, no single justification is exclusively 
dominant in the corporate context. But while practical problems may arise, the 
same justifications are theoretically viable as against individuals. The logic- 
based nature of the corporate enterprise may improve the effectiveness of 
deterrent or rehabilitative punishment, and as responsible actors in society, 
corporations are as deserving of punishment for retributive reasons as any other 
person.
The problem of effective corporate punishment is the focus of Chapter Six below. 
For now, it can be seen that corporate punishment, although problematic, is 




CHAPTER TWO: INVOLUNTARY MANSLAUGHTER
Given that the law of manslaughter is a topic of considerable scope1, it is necessary 
first to clarify exactly what is of relevance to this paper and what is outside its 
range. The purpose of this chapter is to identify that part of the law of 
manslaughter under which corporations may currently be held liable, and in order 
to do so adequately, it is necessary to trace the development of that law which has 
resulted in its present state.
As a species of homicide, manslaughter shares with murder an actus reus described 
by Coke as the unlawful killing of a reasonable creature under the Queen's peace2. 
It is with the mens rea of manslaughter that complications become evident, as the 
offence contains several subdivisions. The first of these divisions is that between 
voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. Voluntary manslaughter covers cases 
where the mens rea for murder is present in mitigating circumstances such as 
diminished responsibility3, killing under provocation4, or in pursuance of an 
incomplete suicide pact5. Involuntary manslaughter is that area of the law 
concerned with unlawful killings where the defendant possesses a mental state less 
than that necessary for a murder conviction. However, the law of involuntary 
manslaughter branches into two parts. The first is that of unlawful act 
manslaughter, based on the unpopular doctrine of constructive liability, which the 
Law Commission has recommended should be abolished6. It is the second of the 
two branches which is of interest to this paper, being the category under which
1 Lord Atkin noted that "[o]f all crimes, manslaughter appears to afford most difficulties of 
definition, for it concerns homicide in so many and so varying conditions" in Andrews v DPP 
[1937] AC 576, 581
2 3 Inst. 47
3 Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1966 s5(l)
4 Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1966 s7(l)
5 Criminal Justice Act (NI) 1966 s!4(l)
6 Law Commission Report No. 237 Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter (London: 
HMSO, 1996) para. 5.16
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corporate offences are likely to be charged, and the only category under which a 
corporate conviction has ever been obtained. While the law has recently become 
more settled in this area, uncertainties in the law of manslaughter were for a time so 
pervasive that naming this remaining form of the offence cannot be done without 
careful consideration. So for now, it will be given the catch-all title of reckless/ gross 
negligence manslaughter; in the course of an examination of the development of the 
law, the reasons for such hesitation will become apparent.
The offence of reckless/gross negligence manslaughter is exemplified by the case of 
Bateman7. The appellant, a doctor, was convicted of the manslaughter of a patient 
who died as a result of his negligent performance of an operation upon her. His 
conviction was quashed on appeal because the trial judge had failed to clearly 
differentiate between the degrees of negligence necessary for success in civil and 
criminal actions, a distinction drawn in the earlier case of Doherty*. Lord Hewart CJ 
in Bateman stated that for a criminal conviction to result, it was necessary that the 
accused's negligence went
"beyond a mere matter of compensation between 
subjects and showed such disregard for the life and 
safety of others as to amount to a crime against the 
State and conduct deserving punishment"9.
This statement is blatantly circular10 - criminal negligence is that which is so gross as 
to amount to a crime - and according to some commentators, leaves issues to the 
jury which should be judicially decided* 11. The Law Commission has noted that the 
dual meaning of the word "negligence" is perhaps the basis for the confusion which
7 (1925) 19 Cr. App. R. 8 For an earlier example of gross negligence manslaughter, see 
Finney (1874) 12 Cox CC 625
8 (1887) 16 Cox CC 306
9 Supra, n7, p!2
10 See Smith, J.C. & Hogan, B. Criminal Law (7th ed, 1992) p 373
11 See, for example, Russell on Crime (12th ed, 1964), pp 592-594 and Williams Textbook on Criminal 
Law (7th ed, 1983) p259
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later characterised the law of involuntary manslaughter12 - negligence can, of 
course, simply mean carelessness, but it also has a specific legal meaning imported 
from the law of tort, conveying the breach of a duty of care. The Bateman 
formulation of involuntary manslaughter required proof of four elements - the 
presence of a duty to take care, owed by the defendant to the deceased; a breach of 
this duty; a causal link between this breach and the death; and finally, negligence so 
gross that it be deemed criminal. However, the requirement of a duty of care for the 
commission of the crime of gross negligence manslaughter has not always been 
clear. As the case law unfolded, and particularly in recent decades, it became 
apparent that two schools of thought existed regarding gross negligence 
manslaughter. One thought that the 'careless' or 'reckless' meaning of the word 
'negligence' simply indicated that recklessness was another term for gross 
negligence; an expression of the degree of negligence required for a finding of gross 
negligence manslaughter. The other thought that recklessness had come to form 
another category of involuntary manslaughter, distinct from gross negligence 
manslaughter. Hence, the working title of reckless/gross negligence manslaughter 
given at the start of this chapter.
The first line of thought can be seen in the House of Lords case of Andrews v DPP, 
where Lord Atkin appeared to consider recklessness to be a degree of negligence - 
he stated that for the "very high degree of negligence" required for the purposes of 
the criminal law, "of all epithets that can be applied, 'reckless' most nearly covers 
the case"13. In cases which followed, such as Larkin14, recklessness was equated with 
negligence "of a very high degree"15, or "criminal negligence"16. In Cato17, the trial
12 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 135 Involuntary Manslaughter (London: HMSO, 1994) 
para. 3.6-3.10
13 Supra, nl p583
14 [1941] 1 All ER 217
15 Ibid, p219D
16 Lamb [1967] 2 QB 981 
17[ 1976] 1 WLR 110
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judge instructed the jury to ask themselves whether the accused did "a lawful act 
with gross negligence, that is to say, recklessly"18, a direction which was upheld on 
appeal. It was stressed by Lord Widgery CJ that "recklessness is a perfectly simple 
English word. Its meaning is well-known and in common use. There is a limit to 
the extent to which the judge in the summing-up is expected to teach the jury the 
use of ordinary English words"19. The Law Commission, in its Consultation Paper 
on Involuntary Manslaughter concluded that "[fjhis line of authority therefore 
suggested that gross negligence, as defined in Bateman and Andrews, was the sole 
basis of guilt in manslaughter (apart from unlawful act manslaughter); and that 
'recklessness' was either identical to or a category of gross negligence"20.
Unfortunately, this clear-cut opinion faced a battle for acceptance against a line of 
thinking which regarded recklessness as a separate and distinct category of 
involuntary manslaughter, for one of two reasons. First of these was an 
understanding of "recklessness" as "indifference". The line of cases propounding 
this view begins, strangely, at Andrews also. There, Lord Atkin noted that "reckless 
suggests an indifference to risk"21, and this concept is apparently distinct from the 
possibility that "the accused may have appreciated the risk and intended to avoid it 
and yet shown such a high degree of negligence in the means adopted to avoid the 
risk as would justify a conviction"22. This suggestion was compounded by the 
Court of Appeal decision in Gray v Barr23, where Salmon LJ stated that "[t]o do a 
lawful act which is dangerous with a reckless disregard as to whether or not it 
injures another is ... manslaughter"24. In Stone and Dobinson25, the Court of Appeal 
formulated a two-limbed definition of "reckless disregard" for the purposes of
18 Ibid, p!14E
19 Ibid, p!19C-D
20 Supra, n6, para. 3.68
21 Supra, nl p583
22 Ibid, p583
23 [1971] 2 QB 554
24 Ibid, p576
25 [1977] QB 354
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involuntary manslaughter. The first limb covered those situations where the 
defendant was indifferent to an obvious risk; the second concerned the subjective 
recklessness of the defendant in circumstances where he comprehended a risk but 
determined nevertheless to run it. No mention was made of the possibility of 
grossly negligent attempted avoidance of a foreseen risk, as had been mentioned by 
Lord Atkin in Andrews, but because Stone and Dobinson was a Court of Appeal 
decision, the Andrews formulation by the House of Lords remained in place. For 
many years it was uncertain whether these limbs were subsections of the category of 
gross negligence, or distinct branches of the law of manslaughter - thankfully the 
issue has now been clarified by the decision described below in Adomako16.
The category of subjective recklessness formulated in Stone and Dobinson can be seen 
developing through the cases of Pike27 (where a direction in the form "Did D know 
... and yet recklessly ...?" was approved) and Lamb, where Sachs LJ appeared to 
consider the state of mind of the defendant at the time of the act in question relevant 
to the issue of negligence. Also, in Cato, it was observed that "in deciding whether 
Cato had himself acted recklessly one would have to have regard to the fact, if it 
was accepted, that he did not know about the potentiality of the drug"28. Finally, in 
Smith29, both indifference and subjective recklessness were espoused as potentially 
sufficient mental states for a conviction for manslaughter, Griffiths J explaining that:
"'Reckless disregard' means that, fully appreciating 
that she was so ill that there was a real risk to her 
health if she did not get help, S did not do so, either 
because he was indifferent, or because he deliberately 
ran a wholly unjustified and unreasonable risk".
26 [1994] 3 All ER 79
27 [1961] Crim LR 547
28 [1976] 1 WLR 110,119C
29 [1979] Crim LR 251
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The Law Commission, reviewing these authorities in their Consultation Paper on 
Involuntary Manslaughter, noted that "[ajgainst all these indications, however, 
there remained the leading authority of Bateman in which, when speaking of 
recklessness. Lord Hewart CJ explicitly stated the test to be capable of involving 
both advertence and inadvertence of risk". In short, the authorities were now 
heading in two entirely separate directions, and were in need of urgent review to 
prevent the law of manslaughter from becoming a mass of common law 
contradictions.
The law of manslaughter was to be affected, along with much of the rest of the 
criminal law, by the House of Lords decisions in Caldwell30 and Lawrence31, 
concerning the mental state of recklessness. Lord Diplock in Caldwell formulated a 
definition of recklessness with regard to the Criminal Damage Act 1971 which 
stated that a person was guilty of an offence under sl(l) of the Act if:
"(1) he does an act which in fact creates an obvious 
risk that property will be destroyed or damaged and 
(2) when he does the act he either has not given any 
thought to the possibility of there being any such risk 
or has recognised that there was some risk involved 
and has nonetheless gone on to do it"32.
The question of whether this formulation of recklessness applied to the crime of 
manslaughter arose in Seymour33, where the defendant had killed a woman with 
whom he had been living in the course of an argument following a slight collision of 
her car with his lorry. He claimed that he had driven forward aggressively against 
her car, intending only to push it out of the way; the woman was crushed between 
the two vehicles and died as a result of her injuries. The defendant was convicted of 
her manslaughter, and the House of Lords approved the trial judge's use of a
30 [1982] AC 341
31 [1982] AC 510
32 [1982JAC 310, 354F
33 [1983] 2 AC 493
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direction derived from Lawrence, which was of the same form as the Caldwell 
direction, but which concerned the offence of causing death by reckless driving.
Until the case of Adomako, therefore, the law of reckless/gross negligence 
manslaughter was represented by Seymour, with slight modifications provided by 
the decision in ReidM - it was not necessary to use Lord Diplock's ipsissima iierba, and 
the formulation should be adapted to fit the circumstances of particular cases35. The 
differences between the Seymour test and the earlier law of Andrews were quite 
radical - now, once the defendant had been proved to have created an obvious and 
serious risk of causing physical injury to some other person, the jury could find him 
guilty of manslaughter whether his conduct was a result of inadvertence, subjective 
recklessness or poor judgement. The degree of his negligence was no longer at 
issue. While this widened the scope of liability, there were also ways in which the 
new test was narrower than before. The defendant now had to create an obvious 
and serious risk of physical harm by his own conduct, apparently ruling out cases of 
manslaughter by omission. Also, the defendant had the potential defence of the 
"Caldwell lacuna" (now acknowledged by Lord Goff in Reid36), that gap in the law 
whereby those who foresaw a risk, but incorrectly felt that their actions would be 
sufficient to negate it, escaped liability. It should be remembered that Lord Atkin, 
in Andrews, had declared that this situation would give rise to liability for 
manslaughter, and the situation would later be resolved in Adomako.
The next significant decision concerning reckless/ gross negligence manslaughter 
came in the Court of Appeal case of Prentice in 1993. It both clarified the law to 
some extent, and was one of two cases (the other being Scarlett37) in which the
34 [1992] 1 WLR 793
35 Per Lord Keith of Kinkel at 796D, Lord Ackner at 805G-H, Lord Goff at 813G-H and Lord 
Browne-Wilkinson at 819H-820A.
36 [1992] 1 WLR 793, 813D
37 [1993] 4 All ER 629
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judiciary called for an urgent review by the Law Commission of the law of 
involuntary manslaughter, eventually resulting in Report No. 237.
In Prentice, the Court of Appeal considered together the appeals of two junior 
doctors, Prentice and Sullman, an anaesthetist Adomako and an electrician 
Holloway against convictions for manslaughter. Prentice and Sullman were two 
inexperienced junior doctors when Dr Prentice was asked by his registrar to 
administer drugs by lumbar puncture to a leukaemia patient. A fatal 
misunderstanding occurred, and Dr Prentice, believing that Dr Sullman was 
supervising both the initial lumbar puncture and the administration of the drugs, 
failed to check the labels on the syringes and the boxes in which they were 
contained. Dr Sullman, however, believed that he was responsible only for the 
supervision of the injection procedure. As a result, the patient died when 
Vincristine was injected into the spine rather than intravenously.
In the second appeal. Dr Adomako was the anaesthetist working on an eye 
operation when the patient's oxygen supply was cut off by the disconnection of a 
tube from the ventilator. After some six minutes the patient suffered a cardiac 
arrest, until which time the appellant did not realise there had been a disconnection. 
The patient subsequently died.
The final appeal concerned an electrician, Holloway, who wrongly earthed a 
domestic central heating system. The back-up safety device, a circuit breaker, was 
inoperative, and the family for whom it was installed experienced a series of electric 
shocks when they touched anything made of metal. They complained to the 
appellant, who unsuccessfully attempted to find the cause of the problem. He 
intended to return to the house to replace certain parts of the system, but before he 
could do so, one of the family was electrocuted in the kitchen of the house and died.
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While the circumstances of all three cases were undoubtedly tragic, even a cursory 
glance at the facts suggests that the degree of moral culpability for the deaths varies 
enormously between the three situations. It is surely significant that in sentencing 
Prentice and Sullman, to nine months suspended for two years, the judge noted that 
"It seems to me that you could have been helped much more than you were 
helped"38.
The defendants in all three cases were convicted of manslaughter, but the tests used 
to determine their guilt were not all the same. Dr Prentice, Dr Sullman and 
Holloway were all found guilty of reckless manslaughter according to the Caldwell 
and Laiarence formulation, whereas Dr Adomako was convicted under the gross 
negligence test. All of the defendants appealed on the ground that the wrong test 
for manslaughter had been applied in their respective cases.
The Court of Appeal held that the appeals of Dr Prentice, Dr Sullman and Holloway 
should be allowed, but the conviction of Adomako was to stand, the correct test for 
involuntary manslaughter by breach of duty having been applied in his case. It was 
the view of Lord Taylor that Lord Atkin in Andrexcs had introduced the word 
'reckless' as a measure of the degree of negligence required for a criminal 
conviction. Lie confirmed that there was still a class of manslaughter by a high 
degree of negligence, even where the defendant was not indifferent to the 
consequences of his actions. However, the specific case of motor manslaughter 
provided difficulty because of the binding House of Lords judgement in Seymour. 
As a result, the Court of Appeal in Prentice chose to consider motor manslaughter as 
a separate case operating under its own set of rules; but "the proper test in
38R v Prentice The Independent 10 November 1991. Quoted in "Medical 'mistake'" Diana Tribe & 
Gill Korgaonkar Solicitors Journal 15 April 1994 p372
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manslaughter cases based on breach of duty is the gross negligence test established 
in Andrews and Stone and Dobinson"2’9.
Later given leave to appeal to the House of Lords, Adomako continued to protest 
that he had been convicted by the application of the wrong test for manslaughter. 
The Lords upheld the Court of Appeal decision, confirming that involuntary 
manslaughter by breach of duty was established where: the defendant was in breach 
of a duty to the victim; that breach caused the victim's death; and that the breach of 
duty was such as to be characterised as gross negligence. Lord Mackay LC stated 
that a finding of gross negligence depended "on the seriousness of the breach of 
duty committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in which he was placed 
when it occurred and whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the 
conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in the 
jury's judgement to a criminal act or omission"40. An important feature of the 
Adomako decision is the emphasis placed on assessing the defendant's negligence in 
all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when the incident in question 
occurred. This is a significant acceptance by the House of Lords of the fact that 
liability for gross negligence can depend on factors external to the person whose 
immediate act or omission caused the death. The implications of this 
acknowledgement as they overlap with the law of corporate manslaughter will be 
considered later.
The effect of the decision of the House of Lords in Adomako was to confirm the 
continued existence of gross negligence manslaughter as a species of involuntary 
manslaughter. The word "reckless" was not to be the subject of detailed legal 
elaboration, but was to be used, if desired, only in its ordinary meaning. It was not
39 Supra, n37 p88
40 [1994] 3 All ER 79, 87
41
a requirement as the appellant had contested, in the direction of juries. Seymour 
was expressly overruled41.
Adomnko, therefore, lays out the correct, and only, approach to involuntary 
manslaughter by breach of duty. Problems remain with the circularity of the test, 
and the responsibility of the jury to decide a matter of law42 - the defendant is guilty 
of a crime if the jury deems her conduct to be criminal - and also with the potential 
confusion between civil and criminal concepts of negligence and duty of care43. For 
now, nonetheless, gross negligence has been confirmed as the proper test for the 
remaining category of manslaughter named with such hesitation at the beginning of 
this chapter.
« [1994] 3 All ER 79, 87E
42 Keating, Eleather 'The Law Commssion Report on Involuntary Manslaughter: (1) The 
Restoration of a Serious Crime' [1996] Criminal Law Review 535-543, 535; Gardner, Simon 
'Manslaughter by Gross Negligence' (1995) 111 Law Quarterly Review 22, 23
43 ibid p535-536; Sharpe, Sybil 'Grossly Negligent Manslaughter after Adomako' (1994) 158 Justice of 
the Peace 725
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CHAPTER THREE: CORPORATE CRIMINAL
LIABILITY
This chapter traces the development in Britain of a system of criminal liability for 
corporations, from the early crude use of vicarious liability through to the 
twentieth century's attempts to find a sophisticated theory with which to deal 
with the increasing problems posed by the intrusion of industry into every 
aspect of daily life. Two dominant theories have emerged, neither of which is 
satisfactory. One, the above-mentioned concept of vicarious liability, holds the 
corporation liable for the wrongful acts of all of its agents, and is primarily used 
in the sphere of regulatory offences. For the more problematic issue of corporate 
liability for mens ren offences, the identification or alter ego approach of Tesco v 
Nattrass^ has become the standard. Attention will then be paid to developments 
since the Tesco case which point to a theoretical cross-fertilisation of corporate 
liability systems. Finally, the explanation of these systems of liability will be 
followed by a discussion of the development of corporate liability for 
manslaughter.
Statutory promotion of corporate criminal liability emerged with the provision in 
the Criminal Law Act 1827 that in the absence of a contrary intention, the use of 
the word 'person' in a statute included corporations1 2. Corporations could be 
indicted after the introduction of the Criminal Justice Act in 19253. It is also 
important to remember that an obstacle to the development of corporate criminal 
liability arose in the form of punishment - certain crimes were only punishable in
1 [1972] AC 153
2 s!4. Criminal Law Act 1827, repealed by s2(l) Interpretation Act 1889 (which provided that 
"person" would include a body corporate in the absence of a contrary intention)
3 s33(3) Criminal Justice Act 1925
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ways which were entirely impractical for the corporate context4. The ridiculous 
nature of the situation which thus arose was clearly exposed by Edgerton:
"If, as in the case of 'felonies', the only punishment available for a given 
crime is one which cannot be inflicted upon a corporation - specifically, 
death or imprisonment - it is generally laid down that the corporation 
cannot be convicted or indicted. But it appears that the corporation may 
commit the crime; for an individual may be convicted of aiding and 
abetting the corporation to commit it, or conspiring with the corporation to 
commit it, though there is no way of punishing the corporation. And the 
corporation itself may be convicted of a crime for which the punishment 
provided is fine or imprisonment, or even fine and imprisonment, though it 
is evidently impossible to enforce the provision for imprisonment. The 
whole difficulty may be readily removed by a statute which makes it clear 
that, whatever the crime, when the defendant is a corporation a fine may be 
imposed"5.
VICARIOUS LIABILITY
The origins of the doctrine of corporate criminal liability lie in the common-law 
concept of vicarious liability, which originally bound a master to all the wrongful 
acts of his servant. This liability decreased in medieval times, becoming an 
almost exclusively civil phenomenon6 -
"Criminal liability for masters ... had almost completely vanished unless the 
master had given his command or consent. Since corporate persons were 
not thought capable of giving command or consent, they were generally 
exempted for criminal liability"7.
4 Comment, 'Corporate Criminal Liability for Homicide: Can the Criminal Law control Corporate 
Behaviour?' (1985) 38 S.W. LJ. 1275,1276
5 Edgerton, Henry W. 'Corporate Criminal Responsibility' (1927) 36 Yale Law Journal 827- 844, 830- 
831 (footnotes omitted, emphasis in original) The distinction between felonies and 
misdemeanours was abolished by si of the Criminal Law Act (NI) 1967
6 Wigmore, J. 'Responsibility for tortious acts - its history' (1894) 7 Harvard Law Review 315-405
7 Bernard, Thomas J. 'The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability' (1984) 22 
Criminology (1) 3-17, 6
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There was one minor exception to the 'command or consent' cases; a master was 
criminally liable for the creation of a public nuisance by any member of his 
household who "layeth or casteth anything out of his house into the street or 
common highway" and caused damage or nuisance thereby8, and it was a 
comparable crime which formed the first known form of corporate criminal 
liability. If local officials failed to adequately maintain the roads and waterways 
of their jurisdiction, the local government units were held to be criminally liable9. 
When private business corporations began to undertake such public duties as the 
construction and maintenance of roads, courts attached criminal responsibility to 
the 'master' company for the actions of its 'servant' agents. This development 
took place in America around the turn of the eighteenth century, while in Britain, 
governmental units retained responsibility for transportation for another century 
and a half. Significantly, the particular officials of those governmental units were 
also prosecuted from this time, and so the English law displayed a fledgling 
tendency to look for an individual to identify with the company10. It should be 
noted that the defence in the first English prosecution of a private corporation 
argued that "in all modern precedents individual members of the corporations 
are included or ascertained, and they must be proceeded against"* 11.
It is well established that, while vicarious liability is not a general principle of the 
criminal law12, one exception is for statutory offences which impose absolute 
liability on an employer for the acts of her agents, even in the absence of 
authorisation13. That a corporation may be a principal in such a case was
8 Ehrlich, J.W. Ehrlich's Blackstone (Westport: Greenwood, 1959)
9 Elkins, J.R. (1976) 'Corporations and the Criminal Law: an uneasy alliance' 65 Kentucky Law 
Journal 73-129, 87-90; also Pollock, F. and Maitland, F.W. The History of English Law, Vol. 1 
(Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968)
10 See discussion o/The Identification Principle below
11 Birmingham & Gloucester Railway Co. (1842) 114 E. R. 492
12 Huggins (1730) 2 Ld Raym 1574, 92 ER 518
13 Chisholm v Doulton (1889) 22 QBD 736
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established in Mousell Bros. Ltd. v London and North-Western Railway Co.14, and the 
test for vicarious liability was laid out by Atkin LJ as follows:
"[W]hile prima facie a principal is not to be made criminally responsible for 
the acts of his servants, yet the Legislature may prohibit an act or enforce a 
duty in such terms as to make the prohibition or the duty absolute; in which 
case the principal is liable if the act is in fact done by his servants. To 
ascertain whether a particular Act of Parliament has that effect or not 
regard must be had to the object of the statute, the words used, the nature 
of the duty laid down, the person upon whom it is imposed, the person by 
whom in ordinary circumstances it would be performed, and the person 
upon whom the penalty is imposed."15
Mousell Bros, was accused of the fraudulent evasion of freight charges contrary to 
the Railway Clauses Consolidation Act 1845. The company was held to be 
vicariously liable for the acts of a branch manager, and the Court's focus on the 
nature of the duty and the person by whom it would normally be performed - 
the "delegation aspect"16 of the test - was seen by Leigh as the most significant 
aspect of the case's contribution to corporate criminal liability.
Corporations were therefore first held to be responsible either under rules of 
vicarious liability for the torts of those under their employment, or later, for 
statutory strict liability offences (which require no mens rea) against public 
welfare. The most significant development in the area of criminal liability for 
corporations came with the judicial acceptance in three 1940s cases of the 
principle of identification - the alter ego idea.
14 [1917] 2 KB 836
15 ibid p845




In the cases of DPP v Kent and Sussex Contractors Ltd.17, ICR Haulage Ltd.18 and 
Moore v Bresler19, the doctrine of vicarious liability could not apply because of the 
nature of the offences charged, but it was held that the companies could each be 
directly guilty nonetheless. The first case saw a corporation charged with the 
offences of making use of a document which was false in a material particular, 
with intent to deceive, and of making a statement (in the document) which it 
knew to be false in a material particular. It was held by the magistrates that a 
corporation could not be guilty of such an offence - the specific requirement of a 
mens rea (the intent to deceive) precluded such liability. Yet the magistrates 
recognised that the servants of the company knew the statement to be false and 
had used it with intent to deceive. Several decades after the American courts 
had recognised that corporations could be guilty of intent crimes20, the Divisional 
Court saw the injustice of such a situation and held that, because "[a] company is 
incapable of acting or speaking or even of thinking except in so far as its officers 
have acted, spoken or thought ... [t]he officers are the company for this 
purpose"21.
The ICR Haulage Ltd. case also permitted an action to lie directly rather than 
vicariously, and the decision of the Divisional Court in Kent and Sussex 
Contractors was here confirmed by the Court of Criminal Appeal. The charge 
was common law conspiracy to defraud, and as noted by the Law Commission, 
"[t]he corporation was not held responsible on the basis of liability for the acts of 
its agents; instead the corporation was regarded as having committed the acts
17 [1944] KB 146
18 [1944] KB 551
19 [1944] 2 All ER 515
20 Maakestad, William J 'Corporate Homicide' (1990) New Law Journal 356
21 supra, nl7 p!55
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personally"22. The case therefore made clear the distinction which existed 
between vicarious responsibility and personal corporate responsibility, and the 
fact that in suitable circumstances, the acts and mental states of an agent may be 
the acts and mental states of the corporation. The question of when acts and 
states of mind may be imputed to the corporation "must depend on the nature of 
the charge, the relative position of the officer or agent, and other relevant facts 
and circumstances of the case"23.
Moore v Bresler held that a company could be liable for the acts of its agents when 
they acted with authority; and even if the acts were for personal rather than 
company benefit, the company's responsibility was unaffected. In this case the 
company's officers acted with intent to defraud the company, but because of 
their positions within the corporate hierarchy, the company was bound by their 
acts. The decision owes much to the concept of vicarious liability, and has been 
criticised for the harshness which that principle brings to the criminal law24.
The above trio of cases, in introducing the principle whereby those in certain 
positions of authority are deemed to act as the company, was of landmark 
importance. The leading case in the area now, though, is the House of Lords 
decision in Tesco Supermarkets Ltd. v Nattrass25. The case concerned the complaint 
of an elderly gentleman; Tesco advertised Radiant washing powder at a reduced 
rate on posters outside their store, but there was no discount on the stock inside. 
When he enquired about the price difference, the gentleman was told that the 
special rate stock was exhausted, and a prosecution under sll(2) of the Trade 
Descriptions Act 1968 followed. The local magistrates held that the store
22 Law Commission Consultation Paper No. 135: Involuntary Manslaughter (London: HMSO, 1994) 
para.4.13
23 supra n!8 p559
24 See Welsh 'The Criminal Liability of Corporations' (1946) 62 Law Quarterly Review 345; Williams, 
Glanville Criminal Law: The General Part (2nd ed., 1961) p859
25 supra nl
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manager was responsible for the breach because his system of daily checks had 
broken down, and made the significant finding that Tesco, as a company, had 
done all it could to ensure that their managers were sufficiently trained and 
supervised. Tesco claimed a defence under s28 of the Act, whereby they could 
escape liability if the failure was due to the default of another person (in this 
case, the store manager) and they had exercised due diligence in their attempted 
avoidance of the incident. Nonetheless, the company was convicted, the 
magistrates having concluded that the store manager was not another person for 
the purposes of the Act, but was to be identified as the company. By the time the 
case had been appealed to the House of Lords, the prosecution had accepted that 
the store manager was in fact another person, and the appeal therefore 
concerned the issue of Tesco's diligence in avoiding the circumstance complained 
of. In the end, the Lords decided that the manager did not act as Tesco's; rather 
he acted for them, and his lack of care did not mean that they had failed to 
exercise due diligence.
What is of real significance about the Tesco case, however, is not the result but the 
reasoning by which it was decided. The Lords gave the definitive statement of 
the law relating to corporate criminal liability, and in so doing replaced the 
"loose and flexible test of the 1944 cases"26. In its place the Lords adopted what 
has come to be known as the 'controlling officer' test from the judgement of 
Denning LJ in HL Bolton (Engineering) Co Ltd v TJ Graham & Sons Ltd27:
"A company may in many ways be likened to a human body. It has a 
brain and nerve centre which controls what it does. It also has hands 
which hold the tools and act in accordance with directions from the 
centre. Some of the people in the company are mere servants and 
agents who are nothing more than the hands to do the work and 
cannot be said to represent the mind and will. Others are directors 
and managers who represent the directing mind and will of the
26 Buries, David 'The Criminal Liability of Corporations' (1991) New Law Journal 609, 610
27 [1957] 1 QB 159
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company, and control what it does. The state of mind of these 
managers is the state of mind of the company and is treated by the law 
as such."28
While this dictum was approved in Tesco v Natlrass, the majority judges had 
different opinions on who precisely the controlling officers of the company were. 
For Lord Reid it was "the board of directors, the managing director and perhaps 
other superior officers of a company [who] carry out the functions of 
management and speak and act as the company"29; for Viscount Dilhorne, only 
someone "who is in actual control of the operations of a company or of part of 
them and who is not responsible to another person ... in the sense of being under 
his orders"30 would suffice; Lord Diplock stated that the category comprised 
"those natural persons who by the memorandum and articles of association or as 
a result of action taken by the directors or by the company in general meeting 
pursuant to the articles are entrusted with the exercise of the powers of the 
company"31. The finer points of the operation of the test were therefore left in a 
state of some uncertainty, but the identification theory nonetheless became an 
established legal doctrine in the Tesco case.
DEVELOPMENTS SINCE TESCO v NATTRASS
Tesco v Nattrass was supposedly the definitive statement of the alter ego doctrine, 
that anthropomorphic conception of corporate status which was to determine 
when a corporation could be said to have possessed the mens rea required for a 
certain offence through an officer who could be identified for these purposes as 
the company's 'directing mind and will'. It presented a type of corporate 
liability separate and distinct from the vicarious liability by which companies
28 ibid, 172




were convicted of strict liability offences committed by their agents. However, 
this division between identification for mens rea offences and vicarious liability 
for regulatory offences is overly simplistic - there exists also a category of hybrid 
offences defined by Clarkson as “primn facie strict liability offences which provide 
due diligence or reasonable knowledge defences such as are common in 
consumer protection legislation"32. The offence in Tesco v Nattrass falls into this 
hybrid category, and yet, more than 20 years later, this confusion is only now 
being confronted for the first time33. In Tesco v Brent London Borough Council2,4, 
the appellant supermarket chain protested against a conviction for selling an '18' 
certificate video to a fourteen-year-old under sll(l)(a) of the Video Recordings 
Act 1984. They claimed the defence provided under sll(2)(b) of the Act that the 
defendant neither knew nor had reasonable grounds to believe that the 
purchaser was not old enough to legally buy the video. It was Tesco's contention 
that because the defendant was the company and not the relevant cashier, it was 
the company's knowledge and belief, seen in those who represented its directing 
mind and will (rather than the knowledge and belief of the individual who sold 
the video) which was to be considered for the purposes of the Act.
The reaction of the Court was admirably practical; Staughton L] recognised the 
absurdity of the argument, which, if accepted would mean that no company 
could commit this offence unless its controlling officers were manning the cash 
registers. As this was obviously not the situation intended by the legislature, it 
was necessary to construe the statute as creating no distinction between the 
company and its agents for the purposes of this offence. Liability could therefore 
be vicariously imposed.
32 Clarkson, C.M.V. 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls' (1996) 59 Modern Law 
Review 557-572, 564
33 Wells, Celia 'Corporate Liability for Crime - Tesco v Nattrass on the danger list?' (1996) Archbold 
News 5-8, 6
m [1993] 2 All ER 718
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Further change to the assumed order of liability came with the House of Lords 
decision in Seaboard Offshore Ltd. v Secretary of State for Transport35. Following the 
Sheen Inquiry into the Herald of Free Enterprise capsize, a new offence of failing 
to take all reasonable steps to secure that the vessel was operated in a safe 
manner36 had been introduced, applying specifically to 'owners' of ships37. The 
vessel in question had suffered engine failure three times within 24 hours, 
leaving her adrift at sea. It was found that the chief engineer, who bore 
responsibility for the ship's mechanical running, had first boarded the vessel 
three hours before she set sail; it was conceded that familiarity with the 
machinery would have required at least three days. The justices came to the 
obvious conclusion that someone in the company was at fault, and there had 
therefore been a failure to take all reasonable steps to ensure safe operation of the 
vessel. This conviction was reversed by the Court of Appeal on the ground that, 
assuming s31 created an offence of strict liability, it did not impose vicarious 
liability on the shipowner for the acts of all of its employees. The House of Lords 
upheld this approach, stating that "jwjhere the owner ... was a corporation 
which could act only through natural persons, in law the natural persons who 
were to be treated as being the corporation for the purposes of acts done in the 
course of its business were those persons who by virtue of its constitution or 
otherwise were entrusted with the exercise of the powers of the corporation"38. 
However, the House also suggested that liability may possibly be established by 
proof that the company had failed to construct a system whereby the safe 
operation of the ship could be ensured. Unfortunately, no argument on this 
point had been advanced before the justices, and the Lords were therefore unable 
to consider this question.
35 [1994] 2 All ER 99
36 s31(a) Merchant Shipping Act 1988
37 ibid s31
38 supra n35, pi 00
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Wells believes that "courts have begun to show signs of frustration with the 
straitjacket [the identification principle] imposes on corporate reponsibility"39. 
This trend towards realism in the attribution of acts to corporations can also be 
seen in the significant refusal of the Court of Appeal to apply the identification 
principle to a health and safety charge in British Steel pic40. British Steel had been 
convicted following the death of a subcontracted workman under the 
supervision of a British Steel employee when a platform collapsed. The 
subsection in question imposes on every employer the duty "to conduct his 
undertaking in such a way as to ensure, so far as is reasonably practicable, that 
persons not in his employment who may be affected thereby are not thereby 
exposed to risks to their health or safety" 41. It was contended that the alter ego 
doctrine should apply, and that the British Steel employee could not be identified 
with the company, but the Court of Appeal took the view that subject to the 
condition of reasonable practicability, the subsection created an absolute 
prohibition.
"If ... [an offence were one of] absolute criminal liability, it would drive a 
juggernaut through the legislative scheme if corporate employers could 
avoid criminal liability where the potentially harmful event is committed 
by someone who is not the directing mind of the company"42.
The Privy Council case of Meridian Global Funds Management Ltd. v Securities 
Commission43 has, according to one commentator, "effectively disposed of the 
myth that there exists some entity which is 'the company itself', relying instead 
on ordinary agency principles"44. Meridian involved an attempt by an
39 Wells, Celia ' A Quiet Revolution in Corporate Liability for Crime' (1995) New Law Journal 1326- 
1327
« [1995] ICR 586
41 s3(l) Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974
42 supra n40, p593
43 [1995] 3 WLR 413
44 Mitchell, Philip 'A Question of Attribution?' (December 1995) Compliance Monitor 52-53, 52
53
international group of investors to take over a cash-rich publicly listed New 
Zealand company. They intended to purchase a majority stake with bridging 
finance arranged through Meridian, a Hong Kong investment management 
company. The plan involved the repayment of this bridging finance from the 
resources of the target company once the takeover had been completed. The 
group of predatory investors included Meridian's chief investment officer and a 
senior portfolio manager, and while both were subject to officers higher in the 
corporate hierarchy, in practice the chief investment officer was given a great 
deal of responsibility and freedom in the business affairs of the company. The 
Meridian employees use of their authority to buy into the target company was 
improper, and Meridian as a result contravened a New Zealand statute. The 
Securities Amendment Act 1988, s20(3) requires that as soon as a person knows 
or ought to know that they are a substantial security holder in a publicly listed 
company, they give notice to the company and to the stock exchange. The 
purpose of the legislation is "to introduce transparency into dealings in publicly 
quoted securities and to help boards resist raids by predator investors"45. An 
action brought by the Securities Commission gave rise to a declaration that 
Meridian's duty to give notice had been breached; the knowledge of the chief 
investment officer was attributed by Heron J to the company. The Court of 
Appeal agreed, holding the officer to have been the "directing mind and will" of 
the company, a phrase used by Viscount Haldane LC in Lennnrds Carrying Co. 
Ltd. v Asiatic Petroleum Co. Ltd.46.
The company's appeal to the Privy Council was on the grounds that this 
directing mind and will was not the chief investment officer, but either 
Meridian's board or the senior manager to whom the chief investment officer 
was, theoretically, responsible. The Privy Council rejected this contention, and in
45 'Company: From the Courts' (1994) 8 Credit & Finance Law (2) 14-15,14
46 [1915] AC 705
54
its advice examined the means by which acts may be attributed to a company. 
Primary rules of attribution, it held, are found in the company's constitution or 
implied by company law, for example empowering the Board or shareholders in 
general meeting to make decisions which are decisions of the company. These 
primary rules of attribution are necessarily supplemented by general rules of 
attribution of equal applicability to natural persons - the principles of agency. 
The Privy Council advice, however, acknowledged that these primary and 
general rules are sometimes not enough. Lord Hoffman noted that cases may 
arise "when a rule of law, either expressly or by implication, excludes attribution 
on the general principles of agency or vicarious liability ... a rule may be stated 
primarily in terms applicable to a natural person and require some act or state of 
mind on the part of that person 'himself', as opposed to his servants or agents ... 
How is such a rule to be applied to a company?"47. The solution proposed by the 
Privy Council is a case-by-case approach with a focus on statutory interpretation. 
Meridian was liable under the Securities Amendment Act because otherwise the 
policy behind the Act would be frustrated; the knowledge which is relevant for 
the purposes of the Act is that of the person who had the authority to do the 
deal, and this knowledge is that of the company. The alternative to this 
construction of the Act would mean that
"Companies would be able to allow employees to acquire interests 
on their behalf which made them substantial security holders but 
would not have to report them until the board, or someone else in 
senior management, got to know about it. This would put a 
premium on the board paying as little attention as possible to what 
its investment managers were doing"48.
The chief investment officer's own improper reasons for not giving notice were 
held to be irrelevant to Meridian's liability; this was necessary for the purposes 
of the Act to be realised. "It is a question of construction in each case as to
47 supra n43, p419C
48
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whether the particular rule requires that the knowledge that an act has been 
done, or the state of mind with which it was done, should be attributed to the 
company"49.
The 'directing mind and will' has therefore become "an infinite variety of people 
from the top to the bottom of any organisation, according to the act which [it] is 
sought to attribute as an act of the company itself"50. This development, 
especially as it reflects a changing attitude on the part of the judiciary, is to be 
welcomed. However, both vicarious liability and the identification principle are 
forms of liability parasitic on the culpability of individuals, and in the next 
chapter, it will be submitted that they are therefore inherently flawed for the 
purpose of gauging corporate fault.
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR MANSLAUGHTER
Corporate liability for crimes therefore developed from vicarious liability for the 
acts of employees, to responsibility for strict liability offences (where mens rea 
played no part), and finally to the adoption of the identification principle which 
allowed corporations to be held responsible for almost the full range of criminal 
offences, where the required mental state was possessed by a controlling director 
who was deemed to act, speak or think ns the corporation. There have, however, 
been very few attempts at prosecuting corporations for manslaughter, and it is 
really only since the spate of cases of death by disaster in the late 1980s that such 
prosecutions seem to have found significant public support. In the opinion of 
Celia Wells, "[t]he introduction of a separate juristic personality for the corporate 
enterprise shows a legal sophistication unmatched in the later development of
49 ibid
50 supra n44, p53
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corporate criminal liability"51. Before the DPP v P&O European Ferries (Dover) 
Ltd.52 case, the only attempts at corporate manslaughter prosecution were the 
cases of Cory Bros.53 in 1927 and Northern Strip Mining Co.54 in 1965. None 
resulted in a conviction. Cory Bros, was, of course, decided before the advent of 
the alter ego principle, and unsurprisingly it was held that a corporation could 
not be guilty of any offence against the person, thus precluding a manslaughter 
conviction. By the time of the Northern Strip Mining Co. case, however, there was 
no express argument about the validity of an indictment against a corporation 
for manslaughter, but the company was acquitted on the facts of the case. 
Explicit approval of the phenomenon of corporate manslaughter finally came in 
the P&O case arising out of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry capsize detailed 
above in Chapter One. Turner J in the Central Criminal Court held that if 
"manslaughter ... is the unlawful killing of one human being by another human 
being ... and that a person who is the embodiment of a corporation and acting for 
the purposes of the corporation is doing the act or omission which caused the 
death, the corporation as well as the person may also be found guilty of 
manslaughter"55. It is to be noted that while not binding, this "ruling must have 
strong persuasive authority [as] [t]he point was argued in great depth by 
distinguished counsel and was the subject of a carefully considered and 
convincing ruling." It is therefore "in an altogether different class from the 
earlier decision ... in Northern Strip Mining Construction Co. ... where there is no 
report of any argument or of the judge's reasons"56.
51 Wells, Celia 'Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability' [1993] Criminal Law Review 
551, 558
52 (1991) 93 Cr App R 73
53 [1927] 1 KB 810
54 [1965] (Glam. Assizes), The Times, February 2,4 & 5
55 (1991) 93 Cr App R 72, 88-9
56 Case and Comment [1991] Criminal Law Review 697
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In spite of this ruling, the prosecution of P&O collapsed57 when it was found that 
there was insufficient evidence against any of the named individuals to support a 
conviction of the defendant company, despite the fact that the inquest jury had 
returned verdicts of unlawful killing, and the inquiry had stated that "from top 
to bottom the body corporate was infected with the disease of sloppiness"58. The 
possibility of aggregating the fault of more than one of the company's employees 
was rejected by Turner J and the case collapsed. P&O escaped liability because 
"communication failures within the organisation meant that no controlling 
officer had sufficient information such that he should have been aware of an 
'obvious and serious' risk that the ferry would sail with open doors"59. As Wells 
notes, "[t]he very failures which caused the accident allowed the company to slip 
through the net of responsibility"60.
Another significant possibility given the continued dominance of the 
identification principle is the danger that "[t]he Crown Prosecution Service can 
use their prosecutorial discretion to criminally 'scapegoat' workers"61. Bergman 
gives the example of the train driver in the 1989 Purley crash who was 
prosecuted for the manslaughter of five people:
"He admitted he passed a red light. Yet it does not seem that the CPS 
considered the conduct of British Rail executives who, in light of the 
known danger of error resulting from the stressful working conditions 
of train drivers, failed to install fail safe systems"62.
The theory accepted by Turner J in the P&O case, that a corporation could be 
convicted of manslaughter, finally became a practical legal reality on the 8th
57 See Introduction above
58 Department of Transport, Public Inquiry, Report of Ct. No. 8074 (London: HMSO, 1987) para. 
14.1
59 McColgan, Aileen 'The Law Commission Consultation Document on Involuntary Manslaughter 
- Heralding Corporate Liability?' [1994] Criminal Law Review 547
60 supra, n51 p564
61 Bergman, David 'Recklessness in the Boardroom' (1990) New Law Journal 1500,1501
62 ibid pi 501
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December 1994. OLL Ltd., the company in charge of the activity centre in Lyme 
Bay where four schoolchildren drowned during a canoeing trip in March 1993, 
was found guilty of manslaughter and fined £60,00063. It was found that "[t]he 
absence of communication between management and staff, the lack of safety 
equipment, the ignorance of emergency procedures among employees, and 
delays in raising the alarm and directing the search for the group all contributed 
to the deaths"64.
The company was responsible for the deaths by drowning of four Plymouth 
teenagers while on a canoeing expedition organised as part of an adventure 
holiday by OLL Ltd. The teenagers65were part of a group of eight students, one 
teacher and two instructors who set out from Lyme Regis harbour on 22nd 
March 1993, intending to paddle across the bay to Charmouth.
The two instructors, who were described as "absolutely inappropriate" by a 
senior official of the British Canoe Union (BCU), had only recently passed the 
BCU's one star award - which the court heard had been passed by eight-year- 
olds and was simply a first rung on the ladder of personal proficiency66. Ognall J 
noted that the decision to take the canoeing trip grievously compromised the two 
young people put in charge of the party67 - a comment which explicitly 
recognises that genuine blame may lie not with those immediately present but 
with those in positions of executive responsibility. Newspaper reports of the 
trial record that the canoes were "not equipped with spray decks to keep water
63 'Canoe centre chief and company are found guilty' The Times 9 December 1994; 'Director is 
jailed for canoe deaths' The Guardian 9 December 1994
64 'Catalogue of mistakes that led to drownings' The Times 9 December 1994
65 Dean Sayer, aged 17, Simon Dunne, Claire Langley and Rachel Walker, all 16. All were pupils 
at Southway Comprehensive School.
66 'Fatal canoe trip left expert 'staggered" The Guardian 26 November 1994
67 'Head of activity centre jailed for manslaughter' The Times 9 December 1994
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out68, some life-jackets had no whistles69, no one wore bright clothes to attract 
attention, no distress flares were carried and the coastguard had not been given 
notice of the outing"70. No safety boat was in attendance. Although the party 
was due to return by noon, the alarm was only raised by the manager of OLL 
Ltd. at 3 p.m., at which time he told the coastguard that the party was equipped 
with flares, had travelled by an inshore route, and was not due at Charmouth 
until 1 p.m.
The gross negligence evident in the operation of OLL Ltd. was clearly referred to 
in a letter sent by two former instructors at the centre to the management, 
explaining their reasons for resigning from the staff. Pamela Cawthorn and 
Richard Retallick closed their letter with the following warning:
"Having seen your 1993 brochure and planned expansion, we think 
you should have a very careful look at standards of safety 
otherwise you might find yourself explaining why someone's son 
or daughter is not coming home."71
The words were to prove eerily prophetic - by 6 p.m. on March 22nd 1993, all of 
the canoeing party had been rescued but attempts to revive the four teenage 
victims in hospital were too late.
The company OLL Ltd. was convicted of corporate manslaughter under the 
identification principle of Tesco v Nattrass; the requirement of a 'controlling 
officer', whose actions were said to be those of the company, was satisfied by 
Peter Kite, the managing director. Responsibility for the system, and also for a 
brochure which claimed that "[wjherever there's a governing body of a sport, we
68 Martin Melling of the British Canoe Union said at the trial that a "kayak without a spray deck is 
a boat with a great big hole in it", (ibid)
69 A Royal Navy sea survival expert said that the victims would probably have survived, had 
their life-jackets been inflated, (ibid)
70 'Fatal canoe trip led by unqualified staff The Guardian 16 November 1994
71 supra n63
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have followed the procedures and guidelines laid down by them for teaching our 
activities", and that "[a]ll activities will run in the smoothest possible way"72, 
was held by the jury to lie ultimately with Kite.
The repercussions of this case for corporate manslaughter law may not be huge 
in theoretical terms - the case was not even reported in the Law Reports - but its 
practical and cultural significance should not be underestimated. Until a 
conviction had been secured in the courts, there remained the possibility that 
those in positions of corporate responsibility would not take the crime of 
corporate manslaughter seriously, but would view it as a threat which would 
never be realised. All that must change in the wake of the Lyme Bay case. The 
government has been forced to change its position on compulsory regulation of 
activity centres73, in no small measure due to pressure from the families of the 
Lyme Bay victims. Such pressure, and the media outrage and altered cultural 
perceptions (of concepts such as corporate manslaughter) resulting from a 
disaster such as this one, can have an obvious and important effect on the 
companies in whose hands the safety of others is placed. It is one of the few 
ways unnecessary deaths such as those at Lyme Bay can be anything other than 
tragically in vain.
72 ibid
73 'Activity centres face curbs' The Guardian 25 January 1995 The Health and Safety Executive had 
just published a report on safety standards at 211 outdoor activity centres, noting a lack of 
training procedures at 16% of centres. As the Labour MP David Jamieson noted, "[i]f only 84% of 
airline pilots were competent, that would not give the travelling public much confidence in using 
airlines". There was insufficient attention paid to risk assessment for some activities, and five 
centres were ordered to improve standards of safety or face prosecution.
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CHAPTER FOUR: ALTERNATIVE THEORIES OF
CORPORATE CRIMINAL LIABILITY
Previous chapters have dealt with the development of both the law of 
involuntary manslaughter and the principles of corporate criminal liability in the 
United Kingdom. It is submitted that those principles are highly unsatisfactory, 
and the purpose of this chapter is not only to explain the inadequacy of those 
derivative forms of liability, but also to outline some of the alternative systems 
advanced by those academics with an interest in the topic. Chapter Seven will 
later consider the proposals put forward by the Law Commission as part of its 
Report Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter1.
DERIVATIVE LIABILITY - WHY IS IT INADEQUATE?
In a recent article2, Eric Colvin identifies the central issue in debate about 
corporate criminal liability as the nature of corporate personality; the 
competition between 'nominalist' and 'realist' theories. The first takes the view 
that corporations are simply collectivities of individuals, and that corporate 
personality is therefore correctly deemed to be fictional - "corporate conduct or 
corporate fault is seen as a shorthand way of referring to the conduct and 
culpability of the individual members of the collectivity"3. A realist 
interpretation, however, sees that a corporation may be more than the sum of its 
parts - that corporations
"shape the outlook and channel the conduct of their members in 
ways that may not be chosen or even understood by any of the 
individuals concerned. They can possess knowledge or means of
1 Law Commission Report No. 237 Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter 
(London: HMSO, 1996)
2 Colvin, Eric 'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum (1) 1-44
3 ibid pp. 1-2
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knowledge that may be unavailable in total to any single 
individual. They are therefore commonly treated as 'real' entities 
in ordinary language and in moral discourse. They can be and 
commonly are 'blamed' when they have failed to exercise 
reasonable care to prevent harm to other persons. Moreover, they 
can be and they commonly are blamed while excuses are made for 
individual representatives"4.
This is the approach to corporate liability which is adopted naturally by 
laypersons. We can accept without difficulty the concept of a large multi­
national corporation 'knowing' something, in the same way that, to use Colvin's 
example5, we can accept that mankind 'knows' how to put a man on the moon. 
Despite the fact that no single individual possesses all the necessary knowledge 
and expertise required to bring about a lunar landing, the information is held 
collectively. Through the interaction of many people, the result can nonetheless 
be achieved.
However, the two approaches to corporate liability which have developed both 
have their philosophical basis in nominalist theory. Vicarious liability and the 
identification doctrine both require individual culpability before liability can be 
imposed, parasitically, on the corporation responsible for, or identified with, that 
individual. Both are entirely derivative forms of liability, and this is a 
completely inadequate way to deal with modern corporate reality. Interestingly, 
criticism of vicarious liability arises because it is both underinclusive and 
overinclusive.
"It is underinclusive because it is activated only through the 
criminal liability of some individual. Where offenses require some 
form of fault, that fault must be present at the individual level. If it 
is not present at this level, there is no corporate liability regardless 
of the measure of corporate fault. Yet vicarious liability is also 




liability follows even in the absence of corporate fault. The general 
objection to vicarious liability in criminal law - that it divorces the 
determination of liability from an inquiry into culpability - applies 
to corporations as it does to other defendants"6.
Discussion of the identification doctrine follows logically from discussion of 
vicarious liability. Despite argument to the contrary, alter ego liability is simply a 
modified or restricted form of vicarious liability, whereby the liability of a select 
few members of the corporate body may be imputed to the corporation. This 
understanding of identification is denied by those advocating a merger theory of 
corporate liability - that there is no vicarious liability because the individual is 
the company for the purposes of the identification doctrine. The two have 
merged, and the directing mind "is not acting as a servant, representative, agent 
or delegate. He is an embodiment of the company"7. This does not, however, sit 
easily with the fact that an individual who causes a company to be liable may 
also be personally liable. Theoretically, this form of liability appears to have its 
cake, and eat it. Brent Fisse notes that the Tesco principle, "which is blind to 
organisational theory and practice, amounts to an anthropomorphic illusion. 
Here as elsewhere in the context of corporate criminal responsibility, the truth is 
that corporations are materially different from human persons, both in 
constitution and being. To rely upon anthropomorphic assumptions at the 
expense of corporate reality is simply to succumb to the myth of a metaphor"8.
Identification theory is therefore confused and ill-equipped to handle the 
intricacies of large corporations. Furthermore, as the size of the corporation 
increases, the number of decisions delegated to managers and agents below the 
level of Tesco 'controlling officers' also increases. Accountability is obviously a 
more difficult goal in larger corporations, where it is all the more vital. Ridley
6 ibid p8
7 Tesco v. Nattrass [1972] AC 153,170, per Lord Reid
8 Brent Fisse 'The Social Policy of Corporate Criminal Responsibility' (1978) 6 Adelaide Law Review 
361-412, 365-6
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and Dunford claim that "[i]f we insist on concentrating on individual acts, then 
the inevitable result is that the more diffuse the responsibility, the less likely that 
the law will hold anyone accountable for the act. If everyone is guilty, then no- 
one is guilty. This is an encouragement for management to decide that 
'ignorance is bliss'"9. Such a situation, promoted by the identification principle, 
goes against the very reasoning of corporate liability for crime. For the 
identification principle, as with vicarious liability in its broader form, there exists 
no necessary connection between liability and culpability - "[a] corporation's 
liability turns on the conduct of corporate personnel rather than on the presence 
of corporate fault"10.
A fresh approach to corporate liability is called for, and the (at least partial) 
abandonment of derivative forms of liability will be an important part of the 
formulation of a liability system which reflects and comprehends the reality of 
corporate management and decision-making.
ALTERNATIVES:
1) AGGREGATION
The first of the alternative modes of liability to be considered is that which 
requires the smallest conceptual leap from the current system. Aggregation is, 
according to Colvin "a step toward a scheme of liability that is organizational, 
rather than derivative from individual liability"11. However, it is only a step.
9 Ridley, Ann and Dunford, Louise 'Corporate Liability for Manslaughter: Reform and the Art of 
the Possible' (1994) 22 International Journal of the Sociology of Law 309-328, 321. James Gobert 
warns of the same result; “[B]y their decision [in Tesco] their Lordships encourage a management 
structure which favours devolved decision-making - not for its theoretical merit, but because it 
will help to insulate the company from criminal liability". 'Corporate Criminality: Four Models 
of Fault' (1994) 14 Legal Studies 393-410, 401
10 supra n2 pi 5
11 ibid pi 9
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The principle of aggregation would allow the conduct or the states of mind of 
individual corporate agents to be added together where insufficent knowledge 
or negligence lies in any single person. Acts of one person could, in combination 
with a fault element possessed by another, lead to corporate culpability by a 
different route, although the necessity of a connection between the two people in 
relation to the act in question has been stressed by some commentators12. It is a 
principle which has been accepted in Holland13 and in some United States federal 
judgements14, where the concept of 'collective knowledge' has been held to be 
valid.
No company should be allowed to escape liability where harm results from the 
ineffectiveness of its internal communications and management structure - as 
Wells points out, "[ijnevitably, there is far more information within an 
organisation as a whole than is possessed by one individual", and therefore, 
"however widely the boundary of identification is drawn, in some cases this will 
miss the mark and fail to capture the essence of wrongdoing"15. In fact, the 
failure-rate of the identification principle may be much greater than this 
comment admits - other commentators contend that "the way in which 
responsibilities are distributed throughout a corporate body makes it extremely 
unlikely that the necessary fault will ever reside entirely in a single identifiable 
individual director"16.
However, Colvin believes that the qualification to the basic model of cierivative 
liability within which aggregation still operates "is so great that the usefulness of 
the basic model is called into question ... The question to be asked is not whether
12 ibid p22
13 Stewart Field and Nico Jorg 'Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: Should We Be Going 
Dutch?' [1991] Criminal Law Review 156-171
14 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F.2d 844 (1st Cir.), cert, denied, 484 U.S. 943 (1987)
15 Wells, Celia Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p!32
16 Slapper, Gary 'Crime Without Conviction' (1992) New Law journal 192-3
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responsibility can be constructed from bits and pieces of information about 
individuals, but rather whether it inheres in the organization itself"17. Similarly, 
Wells notes that "[aggregation needs to be seen as a recognition that individuals 
within a company contribute to the whole machine; it is the whole which is 
judged, not the parts. So the question would not be whether employee X's 
knowledge plus employee Y's knowledge added up to recklessness or whatever, 
but whether, given the information held amongst a number of 'responsible 
officers', it can be said that the corporation itself was reckless"18.
2) SYSTEM-BASED LIABILITY
There is growing support for the more radical view that the ties of derivative 
liability must be severed in favour of an approach which reflects the 
"corporateness" of corporate conduct19. By this is meant the idea of 
"organisational blameworthiness as opposed to merely fault on the part of one 
representative"20. According to Fisse, organisational blameworthiness can be 
found where a corporation "has a policy of non-compliance with the law, where 
it has failed to take reasonable precautions or to exercise due diligence against 
non-compliance, or where it has been criminally negligent"21. Colvin argues that 
"the concepts traditionally used in addressing issues of culpability have 
collective meanings in ordinary language and can be given collective 
interpretations when they occur in statutory contexts". Taking this possibility a 
step further than some commentators, Colvin believes that this approach may be 
used not only for the concept of negligence, but also for subjective fault terms
17 ibid p23
18 supra n!5, p!44
19 Fisse, Brent and Braithwaite, John Corporations, Crime and Accountability (Sydney: Cambridge 
University Press, 1993) pp. 19-31
20 Fisse, Brent 'The Attribution of Criminal Liability to Corporations: A Statutory Model' (1991) 13 
Sydney Law Review 277-297, 281
21 ibid pp. 281-282
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such as recklessness, knowledge and intention. Bergman concurs with this idea, 
believing that in fact
“corporate mens rea is often much easier to discover than that of an 
individual. No individual produces minutes, policies and directives, yet 
this is precisely what a company does. A company's intentions and state of 
knowledge is more readily accessible than those of any person ... The 
problem does not lie with a company failing to have an identifiable mens 
rea, or indeed with it lacking the characteristics which determine 'morality'.
It lies with the failure of legal jurisprudence to define a principle which 
allows lawyers in such cases to identify the mens rea and then judge 
whether or not it is culpable"22.
System-based liability has been adopted in Australia23 and heavily influences the 
proposals of the Law Commission discussed below in Chapter Seven. To avoid 
repetition it will not, therefore, be dealt with in detail presently.
3) REACTIVE CORPORATE FAULT
A possibility is that alternatives to the identification principle should focus not 
only on the illegal act itself but also on the reaction of the corporation to the 
admitted occurrence of that act. This approach has been adopted by Brent Fisse 
in his proposed statutory model for the attribution of corporate criminal 
liability24. Fisse believes his model avoids both the restrictiveness of the alter ego 
principle and the unfairness of holding corporations liable for serious individual 
crime under principles of vicarious liability. He summarises his proposals as 
follows:
"Under these proposals, corporate entities are subject to liability for 
an offence where:
22 Bergman, David Disasters - Where the Law Fails: A New Agenda for Dealing with Corporate Violence 
(London: Herald Families Association, 1993) pi 8
23 See Chapter Five below
24 supra n20
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(1) the external elements of the offence have been committed by a 
person for whose conduct the corporate defendant is vicariously 
responsible; and
(2) where the corporation has been at fault in one or other of the 
following ways:
(a) by having a policy that expressly or impliedly authorises or 
permits the commission of the offence or an offence of the same 
type;
(b) by failing to take due precautions to prevent the commission 
of the offence or an offence of the same type;
(c) by having a policy of failing to comply with a reactive duty 
to take preventive measures in response to having committed 
the external elements of the offence; or
(d) by failing to take due precautions to comply with a reactive duty 
to take preventive measures in response to having committed the 
external elements of the offence"25.
This approach does not ignore the principle of vicarious liability, but qualifies its 
operation. It is not used here in connection with the mental element of 
culpability, but simply with what Fisse terms the "external elements" of the 
offence - the actus reus. The second advantage of this approach, according to 
Fisse, concerns liability for the mental element; he chooses to replace the Tesco 
principle with "the concept of organisational blameworthiness, as reflected by a 
corporate policy of non-compliance or a failure to take reasonable precautions 
and to exercise due diligence"26. Needless to say, an explicit policy of non- 
compliance with, for example, health and safety regulations will be unlikely; but 
it is enough under Fisse's model that such a policy can be implied from the 
actions, decisions and standard operating procedures of the company.
Finally, this model introduces the concept of reactive fault27 - what is significant 
under this concept is not the initial commission of the external elements of the 
crime, but the response of the company to that act or omission. If it is clear that
25 ibid, p279
26 ibid, p279
27 Elaborated in Fisse 'Reconstructing Corporate Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, Fault and 
Sanctions' (1983) 56 Southern California Lain Review 1141 at 1183-1213
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the corporation has failed to re-evaluate its policies and procedures in the light of 
such an event, and has thereby impliedly accepted that event and the risk of its 
reoccurrence, then it is liable under Fisse's proposed code. This approach has 
strong echoes of the Dutch concepts of 'power' and 'acceptance'28 outlined in 
Chapter Five below, and shares with the Dutch approach an ability to examine 
not just individual culpability but the guilt or otherwise of the corporate 
enterprise.
However, it is submitted that the reaction of a company to the commission of a 
criminal act is a factor which needs consideration only in relation to mitigation. 
It has been argued that in the case of a hit-and-run driver, "it is not so much the 
hitting but the running after the event that provokes condemnation" 29. It is 
nonetheless the hitting with which the law is primarily concerned, and so it 
should be in cases of corporate deviance. Were the law to operate as Fisse 
suggests, it would allow corporations to do anything once, as long as the 
repetition of the crime is avoided.
4) AFFIRMATIVE DEFENCES
Concerns with the fundamental approach taken by the courts to the problem of 
corporate liability have led James Gobert to formulate a system-based model of 
fault which centres around a defence of due diligence30. Gobert believes that " [a] 
conceptually different approach to corporate criminality would locate fault 
within the company itself without reference to individual liability"31. For such a 
simple statement, this is a deceptively radical proposal. As Gobert points out.
28 supra n!3
29 Fisse, Brent and Braithwaite, John 'The Allocation of Responsibility for Corporate Crime: 
Individualism, Collectivism and Accountability' (1988) 11 Sydney Law Review 468-513, 505




most theories of corporate criminal responsibility are variations on the theme 
that the company is liable for the crimes of those individuals for whom it bears 
responsibility. He suggests that instead of imputing mens rea from an individual, 
or using false constructs to determine corporate mens rea, the company should be 
able to refute accusations by a defence of due diligence. This diligence, he 
claims, should be proven on the balance of probabilities; "[a]s the company is in 
the best position to know what it has done to protect against the commission of a 
crime, the burden of establishing due diligence should be on it"32. He also notes 
that while compliance with standards within the industry in question may be 
positive evidence, the possibility cannot be ignored that those standards are too 
low and the entire industry is acting in a culpable manner.
Gobert's theory has several advantages. Primarily, it does not fail to see the 
corporate forest by focusing too intently on the trees of individualism. But he 
also takes pains to explain that this approach is not results-based. He claims that 
"[t]he mere fact that a death has occurred would not preclude a finding of due 
diligence ...[for t]hat would be to surrender to the fortuity of consequence"33. 
The focus should be on the harm which the action or inaction of the company 
threatens to bring about, and not simply be reliant on what occurs. This, he 
claims, is the only way to build a climate of responsibility in the corporate 
sphere, which is arguably the most significant purpose the law of corporate 
criminal liability possesses.
The following chapter continues this examination of proposed alternatives to the 





CHAPTER FIVE: COMPARATIVE STUDY
In any examination of the law with a view to possible reform, substantial 
attention must be paid to the approaches adopted by other jurisdictions. This 
chapter will outline the systems of corporate liability in use in the United States, 
the Netherlands and Australia in an attempt to draw lessons from the 
experiences of practical application of alternative systems. In this way, 
comparison can be made with another common-law system, a rare continental 
acceptance of coporate criminal liability, and a statutory model. The section 
devoted to the United States also provides a detailed account of the Ford Pinto 
case which saw the first prosecution for reckless homicide/and which is of high 
interest for the evidence it provides of how corporate conduct came to be 
perceived as criminal.
UNITED STATES
The earliest origins of American corporate liability are broadly similar to those of 
the English law outlined in Chapter Three above, so by the end of the nineteenth 
century, corporate liability for crimes which did not require specific intent was 
generally established in the United States. Originally, corporations were held to 
be liable for nonfeasance1, but not misfeasance2. The move from prosecuting 
corporations only for omissions - failure to maintain, for example - to 
prosecuting also for positive actions, came with the New Jersey case of State v. 
Morris & Essex Railroad Co.3, six years after a similar ruling in an English court4. 
The development of the tort doctrine of respondeat superior in the nineteenth 
century enabled courts to impute the actions of a servant to a principal, and
1 Desmarais v Wachusett Regional School Dist. 360 Mass. 591 (1871)
2 State v Create Works Milling & Mfg. Co. 20 Me. 41 (1841)
3 23 N.J.L. 360 (1852)
4 Rv Great North of England Railway (1846) 115 E.R. 1294
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those of an individual to a corporation, with greater ease. The illogical 
distinction between corporate liability for nonfeasance and for misfeasance was 
therefore overcome, but the case also contained the limiting observation that "a 
corporation cannot, from its nature, be guilty of treason, felony, or other crime 
involving mnlus animus in its commission"5.
In the 1904 case of United States v. Van Schaick6, a federal appellate court held that 
the absence of an applicable penalty did not of itself exonerate the corporation of 
liability for murder - instead, the lack of a suitable corporate penalty should be 
viewed as an oversight unless the contrary is indicated7. Van Schaick involved a 
disaster at sea in which nine hundred people died. An indictment was brought 
concerning the company's failure to make its vessel seaworthy, and the lack of an 
appropriate punishment was advanced as a bar to prosecution. While the 
indictment was upheld, it has been noted that the federal district court involved 
"merely skirted the issue by suggesting that the social utility of such 
prosecutions clearly outweighed such an 'inadvertent' oversight by Congress"8.
It has also been suggested that the protection afforded to corporations in the 
eighteenth and nineteenth centuries because of the lack of suitable penalties for 
homicide convictions could have been removed by the adoption of a judicial 
analogy between corporate dissolution and the death penalty9. This idea, while 
imaginative, is ultimately fruitless - the analogy breaks down, unable to cover 
the potential for corporate resurrection in a different form.
5 supra n3 p364
6134 F. 592 (S.D.N.Y. 1904)
7 ibid p602
8 Maakestad, William J. 'Corporate Flomicide' (1990) New Law Journal 356-357, 356
9 Davids, L. 'Penology and Corporate Crime' (1967) 58 Journal of Criminal Law, Criminology and 
Police Science 524-531, 530
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From the turn of the twentieth century, American courts began to break away 
from the example being laid by the English. Coffee Jr. notes that “American 
courts responded to the political climate of the Progressive era, both by 
expanding corporate liability to include mens ren offenses and by making 
irrelevant the level of the agent within the corporate hierarchy"10. The Supreme 
Court's decision in New York Central & Hudson River R.R. v. United Statesu 
remains the keystone of American federal corporate criminal liability. The 1903 
Elkins Act12 had prohibited the granting of rebates by common carriers in 
interstate commerce, and contained the following provision:
"In construing and enforcing the provisions of this section, the act, 
omission or failure of any officer, agent, or other person acting for or 
employed by any common carrier, acting within the scope of his 
employment, shall in every case be also deemed to be the act, omission 
or failure of such carrier, as well as of that person".
Congress had therefore clearly intended to impose vicarious liability on 
corporate bodies for a crime requiring specific intent. The provision which 
brought about this extension of liability was, according to Bernard13, the result of 
several studies by the Interstate Commerce Commission, which found that 
"statutes against rebates could not be effectively enforced so long as individuals 
only were subject to punishment for violation of the law, when the giving of 
rebates or concessions enured to the benefit of the corporations of which the 
individuals were but the instruments"14. The Supreme Court's reasoning was 
simple - if the law bound only individuals, "many offenses might go 
unpunished". It was added that the Court could "see no valid objection in law
10 Coffee Jr., John C. 'Corporate Criminal Responsibility' in Encyclopedia of Crime and justice Vol. I 
pp. 253-264, 254 Kadish, Sanford H. (ed.) (London: Collier Macmillan Publishers, 1983)
11 212 U.S. 481 (1909)
12 49 U.S.C. ss. 41-43 (1976 & Supp. Ill 1979), mostly repealed
13 Bernard, Thomas J. 'The Historical Development of Corporate Criminal Liability' (1984) 22 
Criminology 3-17, 9
14 supra nil, p495
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and every reason in public policy why the corporation ... shall be punishable by 
fine because of the knowledge and intent of its agents"15. The constitutionality of 
the Elkins Act prohibition was therefore upheld, and the ability of a corporation 
to possess intention through its agents enshrined in law.
The legislative intent to hold corporations liable for the criminal intention of their 
agents requires qualification - the agent's behaviour must fall into certain 
categories. There is no liability where the agent was not acting within the scope 
of his employment or authority, and did not intend to benefit the corporation. It 
has been held on occasion that these two requirements for liability overlap, and 
that an agent who does not intend to benefit the corporate body can never be 
acting within his scope and authority16. It should be noted that it is irrelevant 
whether or not an actual benefit to the company resulted; the intention is the 
significant factor. Where that intention is present, liability may result even if the 
acts in question defied express corporate policy17.
CORPORATE LIABILITY FOR HOMICIDE
The issue of corporate liability for homicide, despite Van Shaick, remained 
unsatisfactorily resolved. While Van Shaick had decided that a corporation could 
be guilty of homicide, the wording of many state homicide statutes precluded 
convictions due to ambiguity concerning the status of the corporation as a 
'person'.
Despite the advances made with the New York Central decision, problems 
remained which prevented the conviction of corporations for homicide. By this
15 ibid
16 United States v. Beusch 596 F. 2d 871 (9th Cir. 1969)
17 United States v. Cadillac Overall Supply Co. 568 F. 2d 1078 (5th Cir. 1978)
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stage, the last federal homicide statutes had been repealed by Congress, and the 
state statutes which governed the offence frequently employed a definition of 
homicide as "the killing of a human being by another human being"18. Such 
terminology clearly excluded corporations, although 'person' instead of 'human 
being' would not.
Initial attempts at prosecuting corporations concentrated on negligent homicide. 
In the 1909 New York case People v. Rochester Railway and Light Co.19, a utility 
company was charged with the manslaughter of an apartment house tenant after 
the "grossly improper" installation of residential gas fixtures. The indictment 
was dismissed due to the wording of the statute in question, which concerned 
"the killing of one human being by another", but the court remarked obiter that 
the simple amendment of the statute by, for example, the addition of the v/ord 
'person' after 'another' would allow an action to lie against a corporation - as it 
stood, however, 'another' implied 'another human being'. Rochester Railway 
therefore saw the conceptual possibility of a corporate conviction for negligent 
homicide receive the approval of the New York Court of Appeals. Although the 
statute's wording stopped the prosecution at this point, the first step toward 
corporate liability for homicide had been taken.
This advice of the Court in Rochester Railway was heeded by the New York 
legislature20 and the amendment of the statute resulted in progress with the case 
of People v. Ebasco Sendees, Inc.21. Corporate liability for negligent homicide 
therefore faced no conceptual barrier or difficulties of statutory construction in 
this case, and the indictment (which concerned the deaths of two workmen in the
18 supra n!3, pll
19195 N.Y. 102, 88 N.E. 22 (1909)
2° N.Y. Penal Law sl25.05[l]
2i 77 Misc. 2d 784, 354 N.Y.S. 2d 807 (Sup. Ct. 1974)
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collapse of a structure which the company had built over a river) was eventually 
dismissed only because of technical defects22.
The first time a negligent homicide indictment against a corporation was 
successfully upheld by an appellate court was in the New Jersey Supreme Court 
case of State v. Lehigh Valley Railroad231. The company's locomotive exploded, 
killing a bystander. The Court observed both the general growth of corporate 
liability and the impediment to such development posed by statutory 
construction such as that in Rochester Railway, faced with this pragmatic approach 
to the issue, the company eventually pleaded nolo contendere and was fined 
$1,00024. While this decision came from a reluctance to stymie the development 
of a system of corporate liability, it was explicitly limited to negligent homicide. 
The ruling did not extend to, for example, treason or murder, or any crime 
requiring "corrupt intent or malus animus''75, but because negligent homicide 
does not entail intention, it can be distinguished:
"A corporation may be held [liable] for criminal acts of misfeasance or 
nonfeasance unless there is something in the nature of the crime, the 
character of the punishment prescribed therefor, or the essential 
ingredients of the crime which makes it impossible for a corporation 
to be held. Involuntary manslaughter does not come within any of 
these exceptions"26.
The United States' first prosecution for reckless homicide came with the 1978 
Ford Pinto case detailed below. Before explaining the significance of the Pinto 
case, however, it is necessary to examine other aspects of the American approach 
to corporate liability which differ from the system in this jurisdiction.
22 ibid at 788, 354 N.Y.S. 2d at 812
23 [1917] 90 N.J.L. 372,103 A. 685
24 State v. Lehigh Valley R.R., 92 N.J.L. 261, 261,106 A. 23, 23 (1919)




Attention must be paid to the influence of the Model Penal Code, which was 
drafted by the American Law Institute for the consideration of state legislatures. 
The section concerning corporate liability27 is premised on the idea that
"the basic purpose of corporate criminal liability is to encourage managerial 
diligence in supervising corporate obedience to law, rather than to punish 
or deter corporate violations generally. This premise in turn rests on the 
belief that the criminal law has no other realistic aim in punishing the 
corporation and should not impose losses on innocent stockholders for acts 
that their managerial agents sought reasonably to prevent. Accordingly, by 
creating an incentive to encourage managerial supervision through its 
provision of an affirmative defense of 'due diligence', the Code seeks to 
accomplish what it believes can be achieved - increased supervision and 
oversight within the entity - without imposing the potentially high cost of 
general deterrence on shareholders"28.
The solidity of this philosophical framework - basically, a belief that corporations 
are inherently good and require merely to be guided in the best way to act - is 
extremely questionable, and a long way from the thinking which underpins the 
law of individual criminal responsibility. There is also uncertainty as to the 
innocence of shareholders; investment is a risk in which one must be prepared to 
take on both the financial good fortune of a company and also the penalties it 
incurs if the shareholder-appointed directors act unscrupulously.
Three forms of corporate liability arise under the Model Penal Code. The first 
concerns crimes where there is no explicit legislative intent to impose corporate 
liability, and in such cases, an equivalent system to that of 'alter ego' liability is 
adopted. A corporation may therefore be liable only when the criminal act of an 
agent is performed, authorised or recklessly tolerated by the board of directors
27 Model Penal Code, Sec. 2.07: "Liability of Corporations, Unincorporated Associations and 
Persons Acting, or Under a Duty to Act, in Their Behalf" (Proposed Official Draft 1962)
28 supra nlO, p255
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or a high managerial agent29. 'High managerial agent' is given a much broader 
definition than its British equivalent, however - it is taken to mean any officer or 
other agent "having duties of such responsibility that his conduct may be fairly 
assumed to represent the policy of the corporation"30.
Where a legislative intent to impose corporate liability is clear, the Code uses the 
principle of respondent superior described above to impute to the corporation the 
acts of an agent acting within the scope of his employment and with an intent to 
benefit the corporation31. The difference from the federal rule lies in a defence 
provided whereby the corporation can avoid conviction by proving that a high 
managerial agent with relevant supervisory responsibility acted with due 
diligence to prevent it32.
Finally, the Code provides for offences of strict liability - because no element of 
intent is necessary for the commission of these crimes, the Code assumes a 
legislative intention to hold corporations liable. The principle of respondent 
superior applies unless the contrary expressly appears33 and a due diligence 
ciefence is not accepted.
The Model Penal Code has been of great influence in the drafting and 
amendment of statutes for many state legislatures - the Pinto prosecution 
detailed below, for example, would have been unlikely without the adoption by 
Indiana of the Code's provisions in 1977, and as such it deserves the credit given 
to it by Maakestad as a "long overdue catalyst"34 to the prosecution of 
corporations for serious intent crimes such as homicide.
29 Model Penal Code, s. 2.07(l)(c)
30 ibid s. 2.07(4)(c)
31 ibid s. 2.07('l)(a)
32 ibid s. 2.07(5)
33 ibid s. 2.07(2)
34 supra n8, p357
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AGGREGATION IN THE UNITED STATES
The breadth of American federal corporate liability is considerable - it is not 
required by federal law that the actus reus and mens rea of an offence be found 
against the same individual. For example, a criminal act could be committed by 
a low-level employee, and the necessary mental state be imputed to the 
corporation from a supervisory official who tolerated the act in question. In fact, 
the person who committed the actus reus need never be identified, if it can be 
shown that someone within the corporation must have so acted. In keeping with 
this thorough rejection of the British identification principle, the company may 
be convicted even if all individual defendants are acquitted.
Another concept which has found favour in some U.S. courts is that of 'collective 
knowledge', whereby no individual agent possesses the requisite knowledge for 
the fulfillment of the mental element of the offence, but such knowledge was 
present within the corporation, albeit shared between several individual agents35. 
It has been held that " [a] collective knowledge instruction is entirely appropriate 
in the context of corporate criminal liability. Corporations compartmentalize 
knowledge, subdividing the elements of specific duties and operations into 
smaller components. The aggregate of those components constitutes the 
corporation's knowledge of a particular operation"36. Similarly, in United States v 
T.l.M.E.-D.C., Inc.: "[Kjnowledge acquired by employees within the scope of 
their employment is imputed to the corporation. In consequence, a corporation 
cannot plead innocence by asserting that the information obtained by several 
employees was not acquired by any one individual employee who then should 
have comprehended its full import. Rather, the corporation is considered to
35 United States v. T.l.M.E.-D.C., Inc., 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D. Va. 1974)
36 United States v. Bank of New England, 821 F. 2nd 844, Court of Appeals (First Circuit) 1987
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have acquired the collective knowledge of its employees and is held responsible 
for their failure to act accordingly"37.
THE FORD PINTO CASE
An expansive system of corporate homicide liability came a step closer with "one 
of the most significant criminal court trials in American corporate history"38. The 
Ford Motor Company, at that time the world's second largest automobile 
manufacturer39 and fourth largest corporation40, was indicted by a county grand 
jury in Elkhart, Indiana on September 13,1978; the company faced three charges 
of reckess homicide and one count, later dropped at the prosecutor's request, of 
criminal recklessness. Recklessness, of course, is a standard of culpability 
considerably higher than negligence - the indictment against Ford was of legal 
importance because of the element of intention inherent in the charge of reckless; 
and intention, until this case, had never been imputed to a corporation.
The homicide charges referred to three teenage girls who died when a collision 
caused the Ford Pinto in which they were travelling to burst into flames. Sisters 
Judy and Lynn Ulrich and their cousin, Donna Ulrich, were making a twenty 
mile journey on August 10, 1978. When struck from behind by a van on U.S. 
Highway 33 in northern Indiana, the 1973 Pinto, driven by Judy, was quickly 
engulfed in flames. Donna and Lynn died at the scene, trapped inside the car; 
Judy was thrown clear but suffered third-degree burns on over 95% of her body 
and died eight hours later. She was conscious following the crash41.
37 381 F. Supp. 730 (W.D.Va. 1974) at 738-9
38 'Ford's Pinto: not guilty' (1980) 95 Newsweek (March 24) 74
39 Swigert, Victoria Lynn & Farrell, Ronald A. 'Corporate Homicide: Definitional Processes in the 
Creation of Deviance' (1980-81) 15 Law & Society Revieiv (1) 161-182,161
40 Clinard, M. & Yeager, P. Corporate Crime (New York: Free Press, 1980)
41 Strobel, Lee Reckless Homicide? Ford's Pinto Trial (South Bend, IN: And Books, 1980)
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Perhaps nothing would have come of the Ulrich girls' deaths were it not for a 
widespread concern which had been growing for some time about the safety of 
the Pinto. In a syndicated editorial for The Washington Post on December 30, 
1976, it was alleged by Jack Anderson and Les Whitten that "[bjuried in secret 
files of the Ford Motor Company lies evidence that big auto makers have put 
profits ahead of lives. Their lack of concern has caused thousands of people to 
die or be horribly disfigured in fiery car crashes. Undisclosed Ford tests have 
demonstrated that the big auto makers could have made safer automobiles by 
spending a few dollars more on each car"42. This was followed by the 
publication of an article by Mark Dowie43 which was promoted on its release by 
consumer advocate Ralph Nader and summarised in The Washington Post 
through a series of news releases. Dowie claimed that his expose was based on 
documents obtained from Ford which showed that, for six years, the company 
had been selling cars with improperly designed fuel tanks which would burst on 
impact. Moreover, he alleged that this knowledge was possessed by company 
officials and that despite between 500 and 900 burn deaths as a result, the 
corporation had ignored tests which pointed to the Pinto's dangers - according to 
Dowie, Ford had crash-tested the Pinto eight times before its release, and it had 
failed eight times44. He explained that the location of the Pinto's gas tank was 
such that a rear-end collision was liable to cause the puncturing of the tank by 
the bolts of the fender. The result would be substantial fuel leakage and fires, 
even in low-speed collisions. The defect in the placement of the fuel tank could 
have been fixed for a cost of about $11 dollars per car45 - Dowie alleged that 
although this problem came to light in the initial stages of production, a decision
42 Anderson, Jack & Whitten, Les 'Auto Maker Shuns Safer Gas Tank' The Washington Post 
December 30 1976: B7
43 Dowie, Mark 'Pinto Madness' (1977) Mother Jones (September- October) 18-32
44 ibid p20
45 Cullen, Francis T., Maakestad, William J., and Cavender, Gray 'The Ford Pinto Case and 
Beyond: Corporate Crime, Moral Boundaries and the Criminal Sanction' in Hochstedler, Ellen 
(ed.) Corporations as Criminals (Beverly Hills, London, New Delhi: Sage Publications, 1984) p!27, 
n2
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was made by Ford not to remedy the error because "the cost of settling the suits 
brought by burned victims and survivors of the dead would be less expensive 
than installing an eleven-dollar fuel bladder in each car"46. When a Ford engineer 
called an emergency meeting to discuss the safety issue, no company executives 
showed up. Most damning of all, Dowie produced an internal Ford 
memorandum which demonstrated that the company had calculated that the 
cost of a recall would exceed that incurred because of injuries and deaths 
"associated with crash-induced fuel leakage and fires".
The article increased the newsworthiness of the Pinto dramatically. A study by 
Swigert and Farrell47 shows how the reports concerning the Pinto from January 
197048 to September 1978 evince three significant trends. Firstly, a vocabulary of 
deviance can be seen developing in relation to behaviour not previously 
analysed in such terms49. There is, secondly, a notable personalisation of harm 
accompanying the new conception of this behaviour as potentially criminal50. 
And finally, there is an increasing focus on the nonrepentance of the offender51 - 
a factor with, it appears, an important impact on the attitude of a public coming 
to see a company as an enemy of its own consumer group. It was in this climate 
of increased hostility toward Ford that the Ulrich girls died, and it was the 
awareness of this that led State Trooper Neil Graves to pursue the possibility that 
Ford's liability for these deaths merited serious investigation.
When Graves arrived at the scene of the crash, he observed that the front 
floorboard of the Pinto was soaked in gasoline, and that the difference between
46 Miester Jr., Donald J. 'Criminal Liability for Corporations that kill' (1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 
919-948, 928
47 supra n39
48 The Pinto was launched onto the automobile market in the autumn of 1970.




the damage sustained by the two vehicles involved was remarkably wide. The 
van, which eyewitnesses claimed was not speeding, was only slightly damaged, 
while the charred Pinto was badly crushed in the rear52. Graves had read and 
remembered Dowie's 'Pinto Madness' article and spoke with Elkhart County's 
State Attorney Michael A. Cosentino, who began to consider a possible 
prosecution of Ford under Indiana law. A revision of the state's criminal code 
which came into effect on October 1, 1977, provided that "[a] person who 
recklessly kills another human being commits reckless homicide"53, and the 
definition of 'person' under the code included 'corporation'54.
The issue of the Pinto's dangerousness was still escalating in terms of media 
interest - Ford were subject to a number of civil suits brought by burn victims, 
and in the case of a 13-year-old boy who suffered burns over 95% of his body, a 
damages award was made against Ford which the boy's lawyer described as the 
"loudest noise that the jury has made in any civil suit in American 
jurisprudence"55. The boy, Alan Grimshaw, was awarded $2,841 million for 
personal compensation; punitive damages, which may be awarded only in 
relation to intentional injury or negligence so gross as to amount to intentional 
injury, were set at $125 million56. Around this time a number of groups in the 
public sector withdrew the Ford Pinto from service57. Accounts of Pinto fires in 
the media increased attention on the deaths and injuries caused while reducing 
the focus on the mechanical defect creating the problem. Harm was, as Swigert 
and Farrell catalogue, being personalised as the Ford Pinto became a national 
consumer issue. At the same time, the responses of the Ford Motor Company
52 supra n45, pi 12
53 Indiana Penal Code, section 35-42-1-5
54 ibid section 35-41-1-2
55 'Youth Awarded $128 Million in Car Explosion' The Washington Post September 8,1978: F2
56 The trial judge reduced the total award to $6.6 million two weeks later.
57 The State of Oregon, Pacific Northwest Telephone Company, United States General Services 
Administration - supra n 39, pi 72
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were generally devoid of any acceptance of responsibility for the problem - only 
18% of media references to company statements examined by Swigert and Farrell 
contained an element of repentance from the corporation58. And so to some, the 
possible prosecution of Ford took on the symbolic significance of a crusade, and 
"Ford's handling of the Pinto ... came to symbolize what was wrong with 
corporate America"59.
Ford had been ordered to recall Pintos made between 1970 and 1976 for the 
necessary repairs in June, 1978, following an investigation by the National Traffic 
Highway Safety Administration. While this was both expensive and 
embarrassing to the company, it was nonetheless utterly overshadowed by the 
news that a grand jury convevned by Michael Cosentino had returned 
indictments for three counts of reckless homicide in September of that year. 
Faced with a maximum possible fine of $30000 ($10000 for each death). Ford 
would go on to spend an estimated $1.5 to $2 million on its defence60. This alone 
is a weighty piece of evidence of the potential deterrent effect of corporate 
criminal liability. The fact that a criminal conviction is so vigorously to be 
evaded suggests that the stigmatising nature of corporate crime is well 
recognised by those whom it may affect.
Cosentino's team, without the resources which Ford could provide for its 
defence, was at a severe disadvantage at trial. It was also fighting a case which 
was limited to a very precise set of facts. The reckless homicide statute in 
question had come into force on October 1, 1977, but had only been amended to 
include acts of omission as well as positive actions on July 1, 1978. Because the 
Ulrich girls' Pinto was manufactured in 1973, Ford could not be charged with the
58 ibid pi 74
59 supra n45, pi 14
60 ibid pi 22
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reckless design and manufacture of the car, but only with a reckless failure to 
fulfill its obligation to repair between July 1 and the crash on August 10. The 
trial judge took the highly dubious stance that material predating 1973 was 
irrelevant to the case; in practical terms, this was a devastating blow to the 
prosecution, who were relying on Ford documents and crash tests for the 1971 
and 1972 Pintos to show that the problem was known to company officials and 
ignored in the development of the 1973 car. Cosentino did not, however, have 
access to results of crash tests at low speeds for the 1973 model and could not 
afford to conduct such research. As a result. Ford's defence team managed to 
keep a great deal of the documentary material compiled by the prosecution out 
of evidence - all but 20 of the 300 documents which were alleged to show Ford's 
cover-up of the Pinto design flaw, according to some commentators61.
The defence also presented an alternative version of the events of August 10, 
with two surprise witnesses who testified that, before she died, Judy Ulrich 
claimed that her car was stopped on the highway. The defence also produced 
crash test results which showed that, even with a speed differential of fifty miles 
per hour, a van of the sort which collided with the Ulrichs' Pinto would be likely 
to escape with little damage. Central to the defence was the assertion that in the 
41 days between the commencement of the Pinto recall and the crash on August 
10, Ford had made all reasonable efforts to alert Pinto drivers of the danger and 
the necessity of repair. While the Ulrichs had not in fact received recall 
notification until February 1979, it could not be said that Ford was reckless in this 
regard - it was simply a tragic irony that the practical difficulty of reaching 1.5 
million customers resulted in the Ulrichs' letter arriving six months too late. 
After four days, the jury returned a verdict of not guilty, but as noted by William 
Maakestad "a larger symbolic victory had been won"62. Corporations received a
61 supra n 46, pp. 928-929, fn 52
62 supra n8, p357
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clear message from the consumers of America that they could not elevate profit 
in flagrant disregard of safety without expecting to be called to account in a 
criminal court.
Since the Pinto case, the trend toward corporate liability for homicide has 
continued; negligent homicide convictions have been obtained in several states63, 
and a reckless homicide indictment was upheld by a New Jersey grand jury 
against a corporation for the use of a flammable material in an amusement park 
haunted house64. Although the danger posed by the foam padding was known 
to the company, it installed no fireproofing or even smoke detectors or 
sprinklers. Eight children died when a youth touched a cigarette lighter to the 
padding, but the company was acquitted following a controversial trial. A year 
later, however, the mental element barrier of negligent homicide was broken 
with the conviction for involuntary manslaughter of Film Recovery Systems in 
Illinois65. The corporation wilfully deceived an immigrant worker about the 
hazards involved in the cleaning work he was to undertake - even scraping the 
skull-and-crossbones symbols off vats of cyanide - and failed to provide any of 
the safety equipment required by law. As well as the corporate manslaughter 
conviction, three of the five company executives charged were found guilty of 
murder. Although the Pinto prosecution was ultimately unsuccessful, the seeds 
it had sown in the psyche of the American public came to fruition here - "Film 
Recover]/ represents the culmination of a fundamental, symbolic shift in American 
law that had been catalysed by the Ford Pinto prosecution: corporations 
fostering or condoning behaviour that had previously been termed 'just bad
63 See, for example Granite Constr. Co v. Superior Court, 149 Cal. App. 3d 465, 470-474,197 Cal.
Rptr. 3, 6-9 (1983); Commonwealth v. Fortner LP Gas Co., 610 S.W. 2d 941, 943 (Ky. Ct. App. 1981); 
Commonwealth v. Mcllwain School Bus Lines, 283 Pa. Super. 1, 423 A. 2d 413,418-419 (Super. Ct. 
1980). However, it has been held elsewhere that a corporation is not a person for homicide 
purposes: Vaughan & Sons, Inc. v. State, 649 S.W. 2d 677, 679 (Tex. Ct. App. 1983).
64 State v. Six Flags Corp., No. 65084 (N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div. Sept. 14,1984)
65 People v. Film Recover]/ Systems No.s 85-1853, 85-1854, 85-1952, 85-1953 (Ill. Ct. App. appeal 
docketed July 1,1985)
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business', and would have led to only a workers' compensation claim, civil suit 
or regulatory action, could now be labelled as violent criminal offenders"66.
THE NETHERLANDS
The concept of aggregation has found realisation in the Netherlands. This is 
perhaps surprising, as it is largely the case that corporate criminal liability is an 
accepted principle in common-law jurisdictions, but not in continental systems67. 
However, the Netherlands operates under a completely different scheme of 
liability. Its basis is Article 51 of the Criminal Code, which provides that 
"[ojffences can be committed by human beings and by corporations"68. Since 
reformulation of the Code in 1976, this has referred not only to strict liability 
offences against public welfare, but to the full range of crimes - explanatory 
memoranda accompanying the reformulation explicitly selected some offences 
which could be committed by a corporation. These were battery, involuntary 
manslaughter by the production of unsafe food and drugs, and involuntary 
manslaughter as a result of a traffic accident caused by a lack of proper 
maintenance of a corporate vehicle.
It is necessary to examine the law before 1976, however, to gain an 
understanding of the development of the Netherlands' corporate liability system. 
Article 51 replaced section 15 of the earlier Economic Offences Act, which had 
provided for corporate liability for any acts done by a person in the course of his 
employment, or by others acting in the "sphere of the corporation"69. This 
liability was obviously of considerable scope, and required amendment when the
66 supra n8, p357
67 Leigh, L.H. 'The Criminal Liability of Corporations and Other Groups: A Comparative View' 
(1982) 80 Michigan Law Reviexv 1508-1528,1525
68 Netherlands Criminal Code, Article 51(1)
69 Economic Offences Act, s!5 (Staatsblad K. 258, June 22,1950)
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law was reformulated to allow corporations to be convicted of crimes which 
required a mental element, and which carried a much greater social stigma.
In the 1948 case of Vroorn and Dreesmann70, a chain of department stores was 
convicted of the strict liability offence of selling furniture at a price higher than 
the statutory maximum. The corporate management had forbidden the manager 
of the department to do so, but this was held to provide no defence - the 
departmental manager was acting within his authority to sell the goods, and he 
testified that he had acted to benefit the company. For these reasons, the 
corporation was held to be liable.
The next significant case in the development of the Dutch corporate liability 
system may have curiously concerned an unincorporated firm owned by a sole 
proprietor, but IJzerdraad7'1 saw a limitation of the ambit of the Vroom and 
Dreesmann criteria. A subordinate manager had deliberately filled in a false 
export return, and the Superior Court72 held the defendant liable under the 
Vroom and Dreesmann principle that the manager had acted within the scope of 
his employment and to benefit the firm. The Supreme Court, however, did not 
find suitable the application of these criteria to a natural person, and concluded 
that for the employee's act to be regarded as that of the employer, it must be 
within the defendant's 'power' to determine whether the employee so acted, and 
the employee's act must belong to a category of acts 'accepted' by the firm as 
being in the course of normal business operations. As this had not been 
established in IJzerdraad, the Supreme Court overturned the conviction.
70 Hoge Raad, January 27,1948, N.J. 1948,197
71 Hoge Raad, February 23,1954, N.J. 1954, 378
72 A regional court of appeal.
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IJzerdrnad was decided in 1954, but once the conviction of corporations for mens 
rea offences became possible in 1976, the distinction between liability for sole 
proprietors and corporations came under criticism. The Vroom and Dreesrnann 
approach was not restricted to situations where the defendant was morally 
culpable, and while this was acceptable in the field of strict liability offences, it 
was insufficient for cases involving a culpable mental element. The more limited 
IJzerdrnad principle was adopted in 1981's Knbeljauw73 case, which saw the 
prosecution of a corporate shipowner for the contravention of fishing regulations 
by one of his ships; however, the ship had only been fitted with nets to fish for 
permitted species and the vessel's captain had been instructed only to do so. 
There was here no acceptance by the corporation of the actions of the 
subordinate and the defendant was acquitted.
The Dutch approach to corporate criminal liability resulted in a manslaughter 
conviction for the first time in the 1987 Hospital Case74. A hospital trust was 
charged with gross negligence because of its failure to remove from service 
outdated anaesthetic equipment; the equipment was not listed as in use, and had 
not therefore been subject to maintenance or the addition of new safety features. 
It was used in an operation in which another mistake was also made - tubes were 
wrongly connected, but the machine to which they were attached lacked up-to- 
date safety monitoring systems and the error went unnoticed. The patient died 
as a result. There was no system within the hospital for the supervision of the 
work of those technicians responsible for such equipment.
The case was heard by a District Court which, being a court of first instance in 
the Dutch legal system, did not make explicit its reasoning. Field and Jdrg75,
73 Hoge Raad, July 1,1981, N.J. 1982, 80
74 Hospital Case, Rechtbank Leeuwarden, December 23,1987, partially recorded at N.J. 1988, 981
75 Field, Stewart & Jdrg, Nico 'Corporate Liability and Manslaughter: should we be going Dutch?' 
[1991] Criminal Law Review 156-171
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however, believe that the criteria of 'power' and 'acceptance' first used in 
relation to a corporate body in Kabeljauw were applied here. They also observe 
that the concepts of power and acceptance "demand an overall judgement on the 
quality of corporate diligence in establishing, monitoring and enforcing 
appropriate standards...The management claimed that they could not prevent 
the unsafe practices because they did not know what was going on. The court's 
response was that liability was founded on the fact that the management was 
totally unaware of the routine practices of the hospital and they ought to have 
been aware of them"76.
It is also important to note that, as evidenced by the Hospital Case, the Dutch 
concepts of power and acceptance "encompass the routinely tolerated as well as 
the explicitly sanctioned"77, thereby avoiding the possibility of a company 
escaping liability by means of a well-drafted set of formal rules which are known 
by all employees to be ignored in daily practice - "[t]he identity of the central 
policies of any particular corporation could only be revealed through a careful 
study of actual corporate behaviour over a period of time. Written statements 
may be indicative or they may be only window-dressing. Acceptance among the 
corporate personnel or the higher managerial officers determines the content of 
the policy recognition"78.
Aggregation of the fault of several corporate agents is also an accepted principle, 
and has been since corporations were liable only for strict liability offences - 
there was judicial acknowledgement in the ATO79 case of 1951 that as long as the 
acts in question were within the sphere of operation of the business it was not
76 ibid pi 65 (emphasis in original)
77 ibid pi 66
78 French, P. Collective and Corporate Responsibility (New York: Columbia University Press, 1984)
p62
79 Hoge Raad, January 27,1951, N.J. 1951, 474
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necessary to asign those acts to particular individuals, and the same stance was 
taken in the Hospital Case - management failure was the required species of fault, 
and even if the supervisory lapses and breakdowns in safety procedure could not 
be pinpointed on any individual, this was irrelevant.
Despite this acceptance of the principle of aggregation (which is founded on the 
discredited system of derivative liability), the Dutch approach is substantially 
based on the truly corporate nature of fault in organisations.
AUSTRALIA
The Australian Criminal Code Act of 1995 applies the principles of general 
criminal responsibility outlined in the Model Criminal Code80 to corporations81. 
Corporate negligence is determined by an examination of the conduct of the 
body corporate "when viewed as a whole", and aggregation will suffice as a 
means of proving the corporation's negligence82. One of the Criminal Code Act's 
radical steps is the abolition of the distinction between subjective mental states, 
which are dealt with under a section simply entitled 'Fault Elements Other Than 
Negligence'83. A basic standard of responsibility is set, allowing corporations to 
be convicted of any offence where "the board of directors, a high managerial 
agent or the corporate culture encourages situtations that lead to the commission 
of offenses"84. The definition of 'high managerial agent' adopted is that of a 
person whose position in the company may be said to represent the policy of the 
company. Due diligence in the attempted avoidance of an offence will provide a
80 Criminal Law Officers Committee [Code Committee] of the Standing Committee of Attorneys- 
General, Australia Model Criminal Code: Chapter 2, General Principles of Criminal Responsibility 
(1992) 
si Part 2.5
82 Criminal Code Act 1995 Part 2.5 s!2.4(2)
83 ibid sl2.3(l)
84 Rose, Alan T995 Criminal Code Act: Corporate Criminal Provisions' (1995) 6 Criminal Law 
Forum (1) 129-142,134
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defence where the act or omission is that of a high mangerial agent, but not that 
of the board of directors. Needless to say, affirmative defences make no sense in 
the context of liability based on corporate culture.
The concept of corporate culture is the biggest step taken by the Australian 
legislature. Such culture is defined as "an attitude, policy, rule, course of 
conduct or practice existing within the body corporate generally or in the part of 
the body corporate in which the relevant activities take place"85. There are 
several ways in which the existence of a corporate culture which fulfills the 
criminal criteria can be proved - "[t]he fact that a body corporate authorized or 
permitted the commission of the offense is proof that a corporate culture existed 
that directed, encouraged, tolerated, or led to noncompliance with the relevant 
provision. If a body corporate fails to create and maintain a corporate culture 
that requires compliance with the relevant provision, this will go to prove that 
there was a corporate culture directing or encouraging the practice"86. 
Permission from corporate authority for the commission of the same or a similar 
offence will thus provide evidence of the existence of a criminal corporate 
culture; so too will the belief, on reasonable grounds, of an employee that a high 
managerial agent would authorise or permit the commission of the offence. 
There is a focus on unwritten rules which circumvents the limitations of the 
identification doctrine - Rose uses the example of employees who know that 
failure to meet a production schedule will result in dismissal, despite the fact that 
compliance with safety requirements precludes the possibility of meeting the 
deadline87. As a result, safety guards are removed from equipment. In this 
situation, the company could be convicted of intentionally breaching safety 
requirements.
85 supra n82, s!2.3(6)
86 supra n84, pi 35
87 ibid p!36
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Colvin complains that "if distinctions between types of subjective fault are worth 
making for individual responsibility, it is also worth trying to make them for 
corporate responsibility"88, and that "the code's scheme for subjective fault ... 
retains the idea of attributing conduct elements from representatives who are 
acting within the scope of their employment or authority"89, but broadly 
supports the provisions of the Code90. The courage to adopt a scheme of liability 
with such a focus on the corporate nature of fault is admirable; a nettle which 
should be grasped by those jurisdictions still blindly clinging to derivative forms 
of liability wholly unsuited to the challenge of modern corporate reality. The 
problem which remains for all jurisdictions is the effective punishment of 
corporate persons, and this is the issue dealt with in Chapter Six.
88 Colvin, Eric 'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum (1) 1-44, 
38
89 ibid p43
90 ibid p3 The Code has also found favour with Wells, Celia 'The Corporate Manslaughter 
Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox and Peninsularity' [1996] Criminal Law Review 545-553, 552-553
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CHAPTER SIX: PUNISHMENT OF CORPORATIONS
Throughout this paper, a constant theme has been the necessity of a system of 
corporate criminal liability which accurately reflects the corporate nature of fault 
rather than simply mirroring the individual liability of agents and officers of a 
corporation. This chapter considers the options generally open to a court 
considering the sentence of a corporation convicted of a crime, and proposes that 
a considerably wider range of sanctions should be available, particularly in the 
case of an offence as serious as manslaughter.
THE PROBLEM OF FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
At present, the only option available in sentencing a corporation is a fine. 
Academic opposition to this state of affairs is energetic; Fisse believes that 
corporations "tend to regard [fines and monetary sanctions] as an insignificant 
cost of doing business"1, and Wells is eager to point out that the assumption that 
the only available option is a fine "shows a failure of imagination as well as a 
certain ignorance about corporate penalties in other jurisdictions"2. In 
Corporations and Criminal Responsibility she argues for the consideration of 
"incapacitation in the form of corporate dissolution, disqualification from 
government contracts and production bans" for severe cases, with "probation, 
adverse publicity, community service, direct compensation orders, and punitive 
injunctions"3 as less drastic measures.
1 Fisse, Brent 'Sentencing Options against Corporations' (1990) 1 Criminal Law Forum (2) 211-258, 
213
2 Wells, Celia 'Corporations: Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability' [1993] Criminal Law Review 551- 
566, 552
3 Wells, Celia Corporations and Criminal Responsibility (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1993) p36. She 
notes, however, that there remains "an insoluble difficulty with maintaining the existence of the 
juristic person for the purpose of administering a criminal sanction" (page93). The opportunity 
for the corporate legal person to dissolve the corporation under company laws is effectively "the
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David Bergman refers to the paucity of alternatives as a form of "corporate 
immunity common to all offenders, whatever their crime", and notes that "[i]n 
addition, there appears to be no rational method, indeed no method at all, by 
which courts come to determine the level of the fine"* * * 4. This stands in stark 
contrast to the situation concerning individual offenders, for whom there is a 
wide variety of penalty options which can be used to further the aims of 
deterrence, retribution and rehabilitation as required. Courts are also furnished 
with a wealth of information regarding individual offenders - age, education, 
social circumstances, a probation officer's report - in order that the sentence 
imposed will be most productive in terms of the aims chosen. Where a 
corporation is convicted of a regulatory offence, however, the court "remains 
unaware of the most basic information on the company - its turnover, annual 
profits, history of relationship with the regulatory agency or its general health 
and safety record. ... It is therefore impossible for the magistrate or judge to 
calculate an appropriate and just fine"5. To remedy this, Bergman argues for the 
introduction of a 'pre-sentencing report' for corporate offenders, "outlining the 
financial situation of the company, a detailed analysis of its safety record, and 
deficiencies in its system of safety"6. This proposal should be strongly 
supported; any information which can improve the ability of the courts to 
sentence defendants appropriately can only be of positive value.
It is important to look objectively at both the advantages and disadvantages of 
the current scheme of sentencing before advocating wholesale change, however,
legal facilitation of suicide" (p 93); in legal personality, however, this suicide need not be
permanent, and the option for the company to reconvene under a different name or with a
slightly altered board of directors remains.
4 Bergman, David 'Corporate Sanctions and Corporate Probation' (1992) New Law Journal 1312- 
1313,1312
5 ibid pi 312
“Bergman, David Deaths At Work: Accidents or Corporate Crime (London: Workers' Educational 
Association, 1991)
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and so the question arises of what positive points can be made about fines and 
monetary sanctions. Fisse claims that "especially in the case of less serious 
offenses, fines are often an expedient and adequate solution"7, with the notable 
advantages of "ease of administration, noninterference in the internal affairs of 
corporations, and contribution toward the costs of enforcement"8. There is also 
the possibility that a fine can serve a restitutive function if part of the penalty is 
awarded to victims9, although this should be accomplished by a civil claim for 
damages. McAdams notes that "to argue that fining a corporation may be 
ineffective overlooks the moral stigma attached to having been fined as a 
criminal"10.
Fines can certainly, if sufficiently great, punish a corporation, and theoretically 
deter both repeat offences by the corporation in question and similar crimes by 
others. This is because, as Gary Slapper notes, "In relation to corporate crime it 
might be thought that the fine was a perfect disposal because, unlike individuals, 
corporations generally behave rationally. Businesses use cost-benefit analysis as 
a routine procedure. The trouble is that such calculations are as much based on 
the likelihood of being caught as they are upon the level of the fine if caught and 
convicted"* 11. The economic calculation which should determine the level of a 
fine should take several factors into account, including "the economic harm an 
organization's crimes have caused, a multiplier which reflects the fact that not all 
offenders are actually caught, and the cost of investigating and prosecuting the 
organization"12. Posner claims that "if the probability of apprehension and
7 supra nl, p214
8 ibid p249
9 Miester Jr., Donald J. 'Criminal Liability for Corporations that Kill' (1990) 64 Tulane Law Review 
919-948, 932
10 McAdams, John B. 'The Appropriate Sanctions for Corporate Criminal Liability: An Eclectic 
Alternative' (1977) 46 Cincinnati Law Review 989-1000, 996
11 Slapper, Gary 'Corporate Punishment' (1994) New Law Journal 29-30, 29 emphasis in original
12 Saltzburg, Stephen A. 'The Control of Criminal Conduct in Organisations' (1991) 71 Boston Law 
Review (2) 421-438, 434
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conviction were one, ... the optimum fine would be equal to the social costs of 
illegal activity, and if those costs rose the optimum fine would rise by the same 
amount"13. Therefore if the probability of apprehension and conviction is only, 
for example, 10%, then the fine must be ten times the social cost of the activity to 
retain its deterrent effect.
The problem which is then encountered is known as the 'deterrence trap' - if the 
amount required for effective deterrence simply cannot be paid by the company, 
then the deterrent value of the fine is hindered. Coffee's explanation of the 
deterrence trap is that "[t]he maximum meaningful fine that can be levied 
against any corporate offender is necessarily bounded by its wealth. Logically, a 
small corporation is no more threatened by a $5 million fine than by a $500,000 
fine if both are beyond its ability to pay"14. A similar problem is faced when 
setting fines underpinned by the concept of retribution; an adequate penalty to 
express public contempt for the crime may be beyond the ability of the defendant 
to pay, and a 'retribution trap' may thereby result, bringing further unwanted 
consequences. As Braithwaite observes,
"[g]iven what we know about how disapproving the community 
feels toward corporate crime, there may be many situations where 
the deserved monetary or other punishment bankrupts the 
company. The community then cuts off its nose to spite its face"15.
It is important to note early in the discussion that a monetary penalty is an 
indiscriminate punishment; the penal force of the fine can be deflected by the 
corporation, resulting in adverse effects experienced by shareholders, creditors, 
employees and consumers. It is argued that these 'spillover' effects are not out of
13 Posner, Richard Economic Analysis of Law (Boston and Toronto: Little, Brown and Company, 
1986)
14 Coffee, John "'No Soul to Damn: No Body to Kick": An Unscandalized Inquiry into the Problem 
of Corporate Punishment' (1981) 79 Michigan Law Revieu’ 386, 390
15 Braithwaite, John 'Challenging Just Deserts: Punishing White-Collar Criminals' (1982) 73 
Journal of Criminal Law & Criminology 723, 757
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place when they fall to shareholders whose stock decreases in value following a 
conviction. Investment is a risk, and those who may have profited from the 
increased profitability of a company during a time when, for example, safety 
standards were sacrificed to productivity, should have to bear the burden when 
such behaviour is penalised16. It is also put forward that the possibility of 
damage to the value of stock can result in increased vigilance on the part of the 
shareholders, and improved accountability within the company. Less easy to 
justify is the absorption of a financial penalty by increased prices - Miester Jr. 
notes that corporations may shift "the burden of fines to consumers, which has 
the perverse effect of making those who are supposed to benefit from 
sanctioning corporations bear the brunt of the penalty"17. A fine of a certain 
level may also, of course, result in such damage to the corporation that jobs are 
lost and innocent employees suffer. In short, one of the most significant concerns 
in the field of corporate punishment is the fact that "[w]hen the corporation 
catches a cold, someone else sneezes"18.
The next drawback to monetary penalties is that, by their very nature, they fail to 
reflect the fact that there is more involved in corporate illegality than the 
maximisation of profit. Other motivations are present in managerial decision­
making; "the urge for power, the desire for prestige, the creative urge, and the 
need for security"19 are the examples cited by Fisse of the nonmonetary 
motivations which financial sanctions cannot directly address. Further, 
corporate hierarchy results in those personnel some way below the top of the
16 Geis claims that the "purchase of corporate stock is always both an investment and a gamble; 
the gamble is that the corporation will prosper by whatever tactics of management its chosen 
officers pursue". Geis, 'Deterring Corporate Crime' in The Consumer and Corporate Accountability 
Nader, R. (ed.) (1973) p347
17 supra n9, p933 Spurgeon and Fagan, however, point out that "[a] corporation cannot always 
pass the cost of fines on to consumers because it will face a competitive disadvantage in the 
market by raising its prices". 'Criminal Liability for Life-Endangering Conduct' (1981) 72 Journal 
of Criminal Law and Criminology (2) 400-433, 427
18 supra n!4, p401
19 supra nl, p219
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pyramidal structure having aims and goals which may be unrecognisable as 
factors tied to an overall corporate profit objective. It is not inconceivable that, 
for example, safety requirements may be ignored within an organisational sub­
unit in order to prevent the closure of the unproductive department in question. 
This action may go directly against the goal of maximising efficiency in the 
corporate body as a whole, being motivated instead by a desire to preserve jobs 
in the sub-unit, but if it is tolerated through negligent supervision, there is 
corporate fault.
Fisse observes that there are certain crimes for which the individual criminal law 
will not accept monetary redress as sufficient punishment; these crimes are 
socially intolerable, and the goals of both deterrence and retribution are served 
only by incarceration. On the contrary, the fact that similarly unacceptable 
crimes are punishable only by fines in the corporate context implies that 
businesses may engage in criminal activity as long as the going rate is paid. This 
is obviously unacceptable; in the case of manslaughter, for example, the law 
cannot send a message to the public that "the cash fine serves mainly as a 
mortality tax that does little to deter corporate killers"20.
Fisse finds further difficulty with the failure of financial sanctions against 
corporations to deal with the issue of individual accountability21. This is perhaps 
the weakest point in his dissection of corporate sanctions. As this paper has held 
throughout, corporate crime is entirely separate from individual crime. If both 
exist within a corporation, both should be prosecuted, but sanctions imposed for 
corporate fault have no part to play in dealing with individual accountability. 
Where there is individual criminal responsibility (and perhaps corporate
20 supra n9, p934
21 supra nl, pp. 221-225
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responsibility imputed from this), then the sanctions imposed in relation to the 
individual responsibility can be expected to address this issue.
Corporate sanctions, then, must be in response to truly corporate crime. For this 
reason, the next limitation of financial sanctions noted by Fisse is of great 
importance to the issue of effective corporate punishment. Monetary penalties 
provide absolutely no guarantee that investigation and reform will take place 
within a company convicted of an offence22. The fulfilment of the rehabilitative 
intent behind punishment is therefore in the hands of the company convicted; an 
unsatisfactory position in the case of any punishment. There are alternative 
sanctions to be discussed below which would empower a court to order remedial 
action to be taken concerning a company's internal operating procedures and 
practices, and this is a welcome proposal of the Law Commission in their Report 
on involuntary manslaughter23.
Finally, there is a problem caused by the structure of many corporations in that 
the conviction of a subsidiary corporation will result in a fine based on the 
financial status of that subsidiary and not the parent company. This could result 
in corporations abusing the principle of separate corporate identity to minimise 
their losses through conviction for illegal activity.
These are the major drawbacks to the punishment of corporations by monetary 
sanctions. It is now proposed to examine some of the alternative sanctions which 
could be adopted to improve the efficacy of corporate punishment.
22 ibid pp. 225-226
23 Law Commission Report No. 237 Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary Manslaughter 
(London: HMSO, 1996) para. 8.76
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ALTERNATIVES TO FINANCIAL SANCTIONS
There are forms of incapacitative punishment which could be used against 
corporations, and which, as mentioned above, have been proposed by Wells as 
possible sanctions for severe cases - "corporate dissolution, disqualification from 
government contracts and production bans", for example. Both Wells and Fisse 
agree, however, that the side-effects of such measures could be extremely grave, 
and could outweigh the harm prevented because of, for example, the loss of 
jobs.24
Perhaps the most appealing alternative sanction is John Coffee's idea of stock 
dilution:
"When very severe fines need to be imposed on the corporation, they 
should be imposed not in cash, but in the securities of the corporation. The 
convicted corporation should be required to authorize and issue such 
number of shares to the state's crime victim compensation fund as would 
have an expected market value equal to the cash fine necessary to deter 
illegal activity. The fund should then be able to liquidate the securities in 
whatever manner maximizes its return"25.
Because the fixed as well as the liquid assets of the corporation are appropriated, 
the ceiling on fines imposed by the deterrence and retribution traps is 
circumvented. As well as increasing the amount which can be collected, the 
public's gain includes "a share in future earnings, as well as ownership rights in 
the company's plant, equipment, and property investments"26. These equity 
fines have the great advantage of preventing spillover effects experienced by 
consumers and employees; instead, only shareholders bear the burden of stock 
dilution, which is one of the risks of investment in a company which operates 
criminally. The fact that there is no distinction between shareholders who
24 supra nl, p230; Wells, Celia op. cit. at n3, p36
25 supra n!4, p413
26 supra nl, p231
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merely invest speculatively and those involved in the management of the 
company is unfortunate, and a reminder of the fact that the spillover effects of 
punishment may never be fully eliminated; innocents suffer as the incarceration 
of an individual may, for example, deprive a family of a breadwinner.
Despite the advantages of equity fines, it is important to note that stock dilution 
may have no effect on corporate internal procedures or the nonfinancial 
motivations behind corporate decision-making. It is therefore necessary to 
examine other possible alternative sanctions, perhaps for use in conjunction with 
stock dilution. While deterrence and retribution are the underlying justifications 
of any sort of fine, there may exist the possibility of corporate rehabilitation. 
Probation orders against corporations may be authorised in the United States27 
and, in the form of orders mandating internal remedial action, have been 
approved by the Law Commission28. There could be an order mandating 
internal discipline, which "would require a corporation to investigate an offence 
committed on its behalf, undertake appropriate disciplinary proceedings, and 
return a detailed and satisfactory compliance report to the court issuing the 
particular order"29. Stronger still is the concept of the punitive injunction, which 
"could be used not only to require a corporate defendant to revamp its internal 
controls but also to do so in some punitively demanding way"30 - for example, 
requiring the involvement of the corporation in the development of improved 
relevant safety features.
Along with the avoidance of the deterrence and retribution traps, corporate 
probation orders affect the nonfinancial values in corporate decision-making,
27 Sentencing Reform Act 1984
28 supra n23, para. 8.76
29 Criminal Law and Penal Methods Reform Comm, of South Australia., Fourth Report, The 
Substantive Criminal Law 357-364, 361-2 (1977)
30 supra nl, p237
103
express society's strong disapproval of corporate crime, force internal corporate 
reform by their very nature, cause spillover effects only in the loss of prestige by 
management (who may have had more opportunity than others to avoid the 
problem in the first place), and avoid the problem of insufficiently punishing a 
local subsidiary of a larger corporation. Bergman believes that not only can 
corporate probation be expressly rehabilitative, it can also be used to
"impose punitive burdens on management which are more difficult to 
transfer than the economic impact of fines ... [B]y requiring conditions that 
lower the reputation of the company in a public manner, probation can 
impose greater punishment and deterrence than mere economic 
sanctions"31.
These exact advantages can also be claimed for the use of adverse publicity as a 
sanction against corporations. In 1970, the United States National Commission 
on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws made a (never fully implemented) proposal 
that
"when a corporation is convicted of an offense, the court may, in 
addition to or in lieu of imposing other authorized sanctions ... 
require the organization to give appropriate publicity to the 
conviction by notice to the class or classes of persons or sector of 
the public interested in or affected by the conviction, by advertising 
in designated areas or by designated media, or otherwise ..."32
In particular, such a sanction strikes at the non-monetary motivations of business 
decision-making; corporate reputation and prestige is the target, and Fisse claims 
that a reduction in profit suffered as a result of adverse publicity is more a side- 
effect than a goal33.
The importance of goodwill to a corporation causes problems with a final 
suggested alternative sanction - that of community service. In this case, the
31 supra n4,1313
32 United States National Commission on Reform of Federal Criminal Laws Study Draft 405 (1970)
33 supra nl, p241
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difficulty is that a convicted criminal may receive a public relations boost from 
the performance of the punishment awarded. The sanction does, however, avoid 
the deterrence and retribution traps if applied intelligently; it affects nonfinancial 
values through the requirement of expending time and effort on projects which 
may be relevant to the offence committed; this also reflects the social 
unacceptability of the crime. One special advantage of community service is that 
"projects reduce spillovers by creating new employment opportunities for 
persons unemployed or at risk of being laid off"34.
However, community service does not necessarily tackle the problem which led 
to the commission of the offence; corporate reform plays no part, and is not 
promoted by the punishment. There remains the possibility of applying a 
combination of sanctions, so that a probationary order could demand the reform 
of internal procedures as well as the performance of community service as a 
deterrent and restitutive punishment. As Fisse notes, "the anatomy of corporate 
crime is so diverse that effective sentencing requires a range of sanctions"35.
The problem of corporate punishment is extremely significant, but as this chapter 
has shown, attempts to solve it have been scarce. The Law Commission's 
approval of remedial action orders for convicted corporate killers is to be 
applauded, but with a potential range of sanctions as diverse as that outlined 
above, it does not go far enough. Monetary sanctions are woefully inadequate; 
stock dilution provides a solution for this problem without involving an over- 
ambitious conceptual leap. With the use of a little imagination, the effectiveness 
of corporate punishment could be revolutionised through the use of 




required is the courage on the part of the legislature to accept the proposals 
being so loudly proclaimed in academic writing.
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CHAPTER SEVEN: LAW COMMISSION REPORT
NO. 237
BACKGROUND TO THE REPORT
The Law Commission report Legislating the Criminal Code: Involuntary 
Manslaughter^ is a progression from the Commission's 1989 report Criminal Law: 
A Criminal Code for England and Wales1 2. The earlier report had as its aim the 
promotion of accessibility, comprehensibility, consistency and certainty in the 
criminal law3. The Commission saw as its next step the closer examination of 
individual areas of the criminal law, resulting in the production of a proposed 
law reform Bill for each area. The eventual goal is the production of a complete 
Criminal Code for England and Wales4.
A Consultation Paper emerged in 1994 dealing with the area of involuntary 
manslaughter5. Once the Commission had dealt with the responses6, it agreed 
the terms of its report on 13 December 1995. The report which resulted dealt in 
detail with the issue of corporate manslaughter. The Commission outlined three 
reasons for this focus7 - a notable swell in public outrage at perceived corporate 
fault following widely-reported disasters, the large number of avoidable 
workplace deaths each year8 and the curiously low occurrence of corporate 
manslaughter prosecutions in English law9.
1 Law Commission Report No. 237 (London: HMSO, 1996)
2 Law Commission Report No. 177 (London: HMSO, 1989)
3supra, n.l para. 1.22
4This policy is fully stated in Legislating the Criminal Code: Offences Against the Person and General
Prmciples Law Commission Report No. 218 (London: HMSO, 1993) paras. 1.1 -1.4
5Law Commission Consultation Paper No 135: Involuntary Manslaughter (London: HMSO, 1994)
6A11 those who gave comments are listed in Law Com No 237, Appendix C
7supra, n.l, para. 1.10





The Commission chose to expose the flaws in the current law of corporate 
manslaughter by referring to several public inquiries following disasters, where 
fault had been found in corporate bodies. The report by Mr. Desmond Fennell 
QC (as he then was) into the fire at King's Cross underground station10 criticised 
London Underground for their failure to charge one person with overall 
responsibility and for not taking precautions against the fire's unpredictability. 
The platform operator of the Piper Alpha oil platform was held responsible by 
Lord Cullen's public inquiry11 for the 167 deaths which occurred there in July 
1988, and reporting on the Clapham rail disaster12, Mr. Anthony Hidden QC (as 
he then was) described British Rail's working practices as "positively 
dangerous"13. Listing sixteen serious relevant errors14, the report noted that "the 
errors go much wider and higher in the organization than merely to remain at 
the hands of those who were working that day"15. British Rail was prosecuted 
for breaches of the Health and Safety at Work etc. Act 1974, but there appeared 
to be a reluctance to make the leap from prosecution for regulatory offences to 
prosecution for manslaughter.
Most significant was the case of the Herald of Free Enterprise ferry capsize just 
outside the harbour at Zeebrugge in March 198716. The collapse of the trial 
which arose from the disaster seemed to many commentators to prove the 
inadequacy of the identification principle in bringing justice to cases of alleged
Health and Safety Executive Annual Report 1993-94. The Law Commission claims that the 
decrease in fatalities is due largely to the decline of the construction industry (Report No. 237: 
Part 1, fn 19)
9Four in total, only one of which was successful.
investigation of the King's Cross Underground fire (1988) Cm 499
uPublic Inquiry into the Piper Alpha Disaster (1990) Cm 1310




16 Detailed above in the Introduction
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corporate manslaughter17. The Law Commission appears to have been especially 
struck by the words of Eric Colvin:
"There is a yawning chasm between the moral condemnation of 
P&O European Ferries by the official inquiry and the legal position 
of the company ... The structure of the law of criminal corporate 
liability prevented any inquiry into the aspects of corporate 
organization that formed the basis of the moral condemnation."18
Colvin suggests that, as an alternative to nominalist theories of corporate 
personality which see the corporation simply as a collectivity of individuals, a 
scheme of liability should be developed according to realist theories which assert 
"that corporations have an existence that is, to some extent, independent of the 
existences of their members"19. This is an approach which strikes out in a bold 
new direction; the opposite direction to such derivative schemes of liability as 
vicarious liability, the identification principle and aggregation, whereby all 
culpability is parasitically attached to that of an individual or a number of 
individuals. And it is an approach which is much favoured by the Law 
Commission in their proposal of a new offence of corporate killing.
THE LAW COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS
The Law Commission proposes a very significant change in the law of 
involuntary manslaughter concerning individuals - the replacement of the single 
overly broad offence with two narrower offences with differing fault elements20. 
This is a welcome move regarding an offence which, it has been noted, "ranges in 
its gravity from the borders of murder right down to those of accidental death"21.
17 See, for example, Buries, David 'The Criminal Liability of Corporations' (1991) New Law Journal 
609-611; Hilborne, Nick 'Company Liability Review' (1995) Law Society Gazette (92/33) 12; Wells, 
Celia 'Culture, Risk and Criminal Liability' [1993] Criminal Law Review 551-566 
18'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum 1-44,18 
19ibid, p2
20Set out in the Involuntary Homicide Bill included as Appendix A in Law Com No 237 
^Walker (1992) 13 Cr App R (S) 474, 476, per Lord Lane CJ
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The two proposed new offences are reckless killing and killing by gross carelessness, 
and it is the second which the Commission takes as the basis for its attempt to 
formulate an offence of corporate killing. The offence of killing by gross 
carelessness is defined as follows:
"A person who by his conduct causes the death of another is guilty of 
killing by gross carelessness if -
(a) a risk that his conduct will cause death or serious injury would be 
obvious to a reasonable person in his position;
(b) he is capable of appreciating that risk at the material time; and
(c) either -
(i) his conduct falls far below what can reasonably be expected of 
him in the circumstances; or
(ii) he intends by his conduct to cause some injury or is aware or is 
aware of, and unreasonably takes, the risk that it may do so"22.
This is not, however, a duplicate of the proposed corporate offence - certain 
alterations must of course be made to account for the nature of the defendant in a 
corporate case. The first hurdle the Commission deals with is the requirement 
that the risk of death or serious injury would have been obvious to a reasonable 
person in the defendant's position, and that the defendant was capable of 
appreciating that risk. This is not a legitimate conceptual model for a jury to 
work with - they cannot be expected to put a hypothetical person in the place of 
a corporation to determine what should be obvious from that position. The 
Commission also claims that a corporation does not possess a 'capacity' to 
appreciate risk in the sense in which that word is used for the gross carelessness 
offence23. For these reasons, the Commission chose to remove the legal 
requirement of foreseeability in formulating the corporate offence.
^Involuntary Homicide Bill, Cl 2(1) 
23supra, n.l, para. 8.3
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In retaining the requirement that the defendant's conduct fall far below what 
could reasonably be expected in the circumstances, the Commission emphasises 
that this approach "is based on our view that the offence ought to be one of last 
resort, available only when all the other sanctions that already exist seem 
inappropriate or inadequate, and that, therefore, the negligence in question must 
have been very serious"24.
The final piece of the offence of gross carelessness which must be considered for 
adaptation to the corporate context is the requirement of causation. The problem 
presented by this requirement lies in ascertaining the conduct which can be 
attributed to the corporation itself. The Commission rejects the suitability of the 
identification principle for determining truly corporate fault, but recognises the 
need, as in Tesco Supermarkets v Nattrass25, to make a distinction between 
organisational decisions and things done at a purely operational level. However, 
the Commission believes that "the distinction should be drawn in terms of the 
kind of conduct that can incur liability, rather than the status of the person or 
persons responsible for it"26.
From this starting-point of principle, the Commission looks to the employer's 
common law duty to provide a safe system of work; an obligation which the 
Commission breaks into the following main branches: "(1) to provide a safe place 
of work, including a safe means of access; (2) to employ competent staff: (3) to 
provide and maintain adequate appliances; and (4) to provide a safe system of 
work"27. The last of these is of particular importance in the present context - the 
Commission sets up the issue of "whether the conduct in question amounted to a 
failure to ensure safety in the management or organisation of the corporation's
Z4ibid, para. 8.5 (footnotes omitted)
25[1972] AC 153
2bsupra, n.l, para. 8.9 (emphasis in original)
27ibid, para. 8.12
activities"28 as a question of fact to be determined by the jury. Stressing that this 
'management failure' test for liability does not make the corporation liable 
automatically for its employees' negligence, the Commission looks to the 
distinction made in Wilsons and Clyde Coal Co. Ltd. v English29 between "what is 
permanent or continuous on the one hand and what is merely casual and 
emerges in the day's work on the other hand"30.
It is therefore possible under the new proposals for a company to be guilty of an 
offence when no individual is concurrently liable. It is also notable that the guilt 
of an individual will not preclude the conviction of the corporation, should the 
evidence show that the individual act which caused the death was attributable to 
a management failure of the type described. For the offence of corporate killing, 
the conduct of one or several individuals is not what is looked for; instead, the 
prosecution must prove a management failure on the part of the corporation 
itself. In perhaps the single most radical step of the proposed reform, the Law 
Commission would therefore introduce a form of corporate criminal liability 
which is not in any way parasitic on the conduct of individuals.
To accompany this new approach to liability, the Commission proposes welcome 
new powers enabling courts to order remedial action. Companies convicted of 
corporate killing could be ordered "to take such steps, within such time, as the 
order specifies for remedying the failure in question and any matter which 
appears to the court to have resulted from the failure and been the cause or one 
of the causes of the death"31.
28 ibid, para. 8.19 (emphasis in original)
29 [1938] AC 57
30 1936 SC 883, 904
31 supra nl para. 8.76 - s5 Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill (Law. Com. No.237 London: HMSO, 
1996) pi38
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In summary, the Commission recommends a special offence of corporate killing, 
broadly corresponding to the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness. 
Like the individual offence, it would be necessary for the defendant's conduct to 
fall far below what could reasonably be expected, but in contrast to the 
individual crime, the corporate offence would not require that the risk be 
obvious, or that the defendant be capable of appreciating the risk. A death 
should be deemed to be caused by a corporation's conduct if caused by a failure, 
in the way the corporation's activities are managed or organised, to ensure the 
health and safety of persons employed in or affected by those activities. This 
management failure may be a cause of a person's death even where the 
immediate cause is the act or omission of an individual. In the Law 
Commission's Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill, the offence of corporate killing is 
stated as follows:
"4. - (1) A corporation is guilty of corporate killing if -
(a) a management failure by the corporation is the cause or one of the 
causes of a person's death; and
(b) that failure constitutes conduct falling far below what can 
reasonably be expected of the corporation in the circumstances.
(2) For the purposes of subsection (1) above - 
a) there is a management failure by a corporation if the way in which 
its activities are managed or organised fails to ensure the health and 
safety of persons employed in or affected by those activities; and 
(b) such a failure may be regarded as a cause of a person's death 
notwithstanding that the immediate cause is the act or omission of an 
individual"32.
REACTION TO THE LAW COMMISSION'S PROPOSALS
Academic responses to the Commission's Report have noted the possibility of 
"more marginalisation of corporate killing rather than less"33 due to the
32 s4 Draft Involuntary Homicide Bill (Law. Com. No.237 London: HMSO, 1996) pl37
33 vVells, Celia 'The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox and Peninsularity' 
[1996] Criminal Law Review 545-553, 553
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proposed creation of a special category of offence. The concern is that "the 
creation of a separate offence could mean that corporate killings would be 
perceived as different from 'manslaughter' or the new substitute offences. This 
could lead to a downgrading of the stigma and seriousness of the new offence, 
and could contribute to its continued marginalisation in terms of enforcement"34.
Clarkson takes issue with the Commission's finding that corporations cannot 
possess 'capacity' to appreciate risk in the sense in which that word is used for 
the individual offence of killing by gross carelessness; he believes simply that the 
issues for consideration are "whether the risks would have been obvious to a 
reasonable corporation in that position and whether the corporation had the 
capacity to appreciate the risks"35. Moreover, he feels that "this latter 
requirement that the company have capacity to appreciate risks will be of little 
significance in practice because a company, by definition, will necessarily have 
this capacity if the risks are obvious"36.
The belief that corporations cannot possess 'capacity' to appreciate risk "misses 
the central point that, while corporations are only metaphysical entities, this does 
not prevent them from being culpability-bearing agents who through their rules, 
policies and operational procedures can exhibit the requisite degree of mens rea 
and be blamed therefor"37. If we are to develop a workable system of corporate 
liability tailored to the fault of the corporation itself, then the realisation must be 
made that corporate bodies are more than the sum of their parts; that they are in 
fact capable of forming policies and achieving objectives which may reflect the 
individual policies or objectives of none of their executive officers. The nature of
34 Clarkson, C.M.V. 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls' (1996) 59 Modern Law 
Review 557-572, 569
35 ibid p571
36 ibid Argument based on Elliot v C (a minor) (1983) 77 Cr. App. R. 103 that a corporation is in 
some way mentally backward or unfit to comprehend risks would clearly not be accepted.
37 ibid p571
group decision-making, with its inevitable negotiations and compromises, means 
that there is a separation between corporate aims and actions and the individuals 
who make up the company. But, as Clarkson notes, corporations "do not lack 
cognitive capacity or the ability to engage in practical reasoning, or to exercise 
control over their actions - the classic hallmarks of responsibility"38. 
Corporations can be deemed to be responsible for their actions under either of 
the two main theories of responsibility outlined by Clarkson; capacity theory 
looks to an agent's capacity to reason and to control his actions, and to choose 
compliance or non-compliance with the law, while character theory demands 
that those actions which express a person's character are those for which they 
can be held responsible. Neither of these theories requires the identification of a 
corporate agent as the embodiment of the company - the application of such a 
rule of attribution would actually ignore the fact that a corporation "marches on 
its elephantine way almost indifferent to its succession of riders"39.
Disaster Action, a group formed by survivors and relatives of those killed in 
several of the high-profile tragedies which have occurred in the last decade, 
believes that the proposals do not go far enough - they are especially concerned 
about two issues; the Report's failure to deal with the lack of police involvement 
in the investigation of deaths due to corporate activities, and the Commission's 
avoidance of the problem of the current insufficiency of sentencing options. 
Disaster Action believes that "[t]he proposed new power of ordering a company 
to 'remedy the cause of a death' may not be wide enough to ensure that a judge 
can order wide-ranging structural changes to turn a dangerous company into a 
safe one"40. The group is presently involved in drafting a Private Member's Bill 
which it intends will "propose a series of new offences of recklessness and
38 ibid p567
39 Boulding The Organizational Revolution (New York: Harper and Brothers, 1968)
40 Disaster Action Press Release 'Corporate Killing - Support from Disaster Action for Law 
Commission Recommendations' 4 March 1996
negligence where death or serious injury occurs; extend the principle of 
culpability to apply not only to the general law of manslaughter but to all the 
new offences proposed; and set out a series of new sentencing options, including 
corporate probation, for companies. It will also aim to impose stringent duties 
upon company directors concerning safety and create a new regime for the 
enforcement of safety law"41.
While the Commission's attention to the problem of corporate liability for 
causing death is very welcome, concern has been voiced over the possibility of 
pressure for reform in other types of corporate crime reducing because the 
newsworthy topic of corporate manslaughter has been dealt with. The fear of 
marginalisation is therefore not confined to the potential sidelining of corporate 
killing within the field of homicide, but also reflects the possibility of 'lesser' 
corporate crimes (for example financial crimes, or offences resulting in injury but 
not death) being overlooked once the most sensational aspect of corporate crime 
has received attention. These other corporate crimes will still be subject to the 
doctrines of identification and vicarious liability, which are no less unsatisfactory 
in a non-fatal context.
A final complaint registered by Clarkson concerns the power of the court, 
following a conviction for corporate killing, to order remedial action to be taken 
by a company in relation to a cause of death. This power is not mentioned 
should a company be convicted of either of the proposed offences of reckless 
killing or killing by gross negligence42. While Clarkson is probably correct to 
assume that this is an oversight on the part of the Commission, it should
41 Dix, Pamela 'Corporate Responsibility for Public Safety' (Nov/Dec 1995) 5 Consumer Policy 
Review (6) 200-202, 202
42 supra n34, p569, fn88
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nevertheless be amended to allow this improvement to sentencing options to 
apply to all offences of which a corporation may be guilty.
Celia Wells complains of the continued use of the traditional form of alter ego 
liability for corporate prosecution of the 'individual' offences, believing that 
"[t]he volatility in this area evidenced in the Meridian decision points up the 
problems in addressing corporate liabililty reform through the medium of a new, 
additional offence, at the expense of a new generic route to liability for all 
offences"43. She also registers disappointment with the Commission's failure to 
examine reform proposals in other common law jurisdictions44, and argues for 
the introduction of an organisational liability mechanism similar to the detailed 
one found in the 1995 Australian Criminal Code Act45, which provides that 
offences of intention, knowledge or recklessness may be proved where the body 
corporate "expressly, tacitly or impliedly authorised or permitted the 
commission of the offence"46. One of the three ways in which authorisation or 
permission can be shown is based on examination of the 'corporate culture', 
which includes the policies, procedures and rules of the company, and also 
evidence of unwritten rules and attitudes leading to an atmosphere of non- 
compliance. Wells believes that this approach shows a better appreciation than 
the Law Commission does of the lesson from corporate killing cases that 
"corporate defendants are highly motivated and well-placed to exploit the 
metaphysical gap between 'the company' and its members"47, and approves the 
President of the Australian Law Reform Commission's statement that "[t]his 
approach quite clearly seeks to address the significant criticisms of the 1972 Tesco 
decision, which restricted corporate criminal liability to the conduct or fault of
43 supra n34, p549 footnotes omitted
44 Wells, Celia 'The Corporate Manslaughter Proposals: Pragmatism, Paradox and Peninsularity' 
[1996] Criminal Law Review 545-553, 553
45 See Chapter Six above
46 Australian Criminal Code Act 1995 (Cth.), s!2.3
47 supra n44, p552
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high-level managers or a delegate with full discretion to act independently of in- 
house instructions, an approach ironically appropriate to the small and medium­
sized business, with which large national and multi-national corporations have 
almost nothing in common"48.
Despite the criticisms which have arisen, the Law Commission's attention to the 
topic of corporate killing is of course welcome. In the Conclusion which follows, 
this paper's support for a system-based theory of corporate liability will be 
summarised.
48 Rose, Alan '1995 Australian Criminal Code Act: Corporate Criminal Provisions' (1995) 6 
Criminal Law Forum 129-142,135-136
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CONCLUSIONS
The themes underlying this paper are simple. The current system of corporate 
liability for manslaughter is entirely derivative; conviction of a company is 
parasitic on the conviction of an individual. Under the Tesco principle, only the 
acts and states of minds of a limited class of 'controlling officers' can be treated 
as the acts and states of minds of the company - a specialised version of vicarious 
liability therefore results. Therefore, as Disaster Action notes, "under the present 
law, there is no difference between the guilt of a senior manager or the company. 
If the individual is guilty, the company is guilty; if there is insufficient evidence 
against the individual, then the same goes for the company"1.
This has major disadvantages; scapegoating is possible, with some commentators 
fearing that prosecution will only reach a "vice-president responsible for going 
to jail"2. It is least suited to the situations in which it is most likely to be needed, 
where large companies delegate responsibility and collective knowledge and 
decision-making are the means by which information is processed. The 
conviction of a small company where a single director makes effectively all 
decisions is plausible under the identification doctrine, but if the corporate 
structure is any more complicated than this, problems develop with the 
distinction between the company's 'brain' and 'hands'. As Friedman notes, 
"[ijnstead of coming to grips with the corporate organization, the law proceeded 
to apply the natural person model to the fictional corporate person ... [As a 
result, t]he anthropomorphization of the corporation has thoroughly infected 
legal thought"3. The anthropomorphic conception of the corporation is, it is
1 Disaster Action Response to the Law Commission Involuntary Manslaughter Consultation Paper (1994)
2 Braithwaite, John Corporate Crime in the Pharmaceutical Industry (London: Routledge, 1984) p308
3 Friedman, Howard M. 'Some Reflections on the Corporation as Criminal Defendant' (1979) 55 
Notre Dame Lawyer 173-202,173
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submitted, an out-dated conceptual tool which is no longer required for society 
to understand what is done 'by the corporation'.
Corporations must be seen as genuine persons with duties and responsiblities. 
Justifications for the punishment of individuals are therefore equally valid for 
the punishment of corporate persons; problems arise involving the effectiveness 
and the practical disadvantages of corporate punishment, but these do not 
negate the sound philosophical reasons for subjecting corporations to the 
criminal law. They may, by their reason-based nature, be more receptive to the 
possibility of deterrence and rehabilitation than individuals, and are no less 
deserving of society's censure and retribution for the harm they cause.
In the place of derivative forms of liability, there must be a new conceptual 
framework, which must take as its starting-point the common sense 
understanding that "[i]f it is the company that is culpable, then it is the company 
that deserves prosecution and punishment"4. The concept of aggregation has 
been considered and rejected because of its basis in vicarious liability. If the 
imputation of acts and mental states from individuals is unsatisfactory, then it 
would be inconsistent to accept the imputation of external and mental fault 
elements from seiieral individuals. It is conceptually unsound to hold that, for 
example, knowledge held by one person coupled with the negligence of another 
could amount to recklessness on the part of the corporation.
The concept of reactive corporate fault advanced by Fisse and Braithwaite5 is, it 
is argued, equally flawed. It takes a factor which goes to mitigation and uses it 
to determine guilt. A company's failure to react to the commission of an offence
4 Clarkson, C.M.V. 'Kicking Corporate Bodies and Damning Their Souls' (1996) 59 Modern Law 
Review 557-572, 562
5See Fisse, Brent and Braithwaite, John 'Reconstructing Criminal Law: Deterrence, Retribution, 
Fault and Sanctions' (1983) 56 Southern California Law Review 1141 at 1183-1213
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in contravention of a probation order mandating remedial action would 
constitute an offence, but the sloppy management which resulted in the original 
crime is all that must be considered in the punishment of that original crime.
The way forward for corporate criminal liability lies in a system-based approach 
which properly examines the corporate structure in which the offence was 
committed and considers whether the offence was a result of, or was authorised 
or permitted by, the corporate culture evidenced thereby. This idea borrows 
heavily from the provisions of the Australian Criminal Code Act 1995. For such 
an approach, the concept of 'due diligence' or 'reasonable precautions' defences 
becomes, of course, obsolete, as if the company had been duly diligent or taken 
reasonable precautions, it would not possess a criminal corporate culture. Where 
this paper diverges from the Australian position is in the adoption of 
aggregation as a system for determining negligence, and in the abolition of the 
distinction between subjective mental states; as Colvin notes, these distinctions 
are highly significant in the individual criminal law, and an attempt must be 
made to preserve them for the corporate context* 6. Corporate intent is to be 
found in both express and implied corporate policy, and of our understanding of 
collective knowledge, Colvin states that "[i]t would be misleading to conceive [of 
collective knowledge] as simply an aggregation of individual knowledge, and a 
serious error to describe it as a fiction"7.
The law of manslaughter laid out in Adomako8 leaves issues of law to the jury, 
and provides an unsatisfactory test for liability whereby conduct is criminal if the 
jury considers negligence to be so gross as to justify a criminal conviction. 
However, the emphasis placed on all the circumstances in which the defendant
'’Colvin, Eric 'Corporate Personality and Criminal Liability' (1995) 6 Criminal Law Forum (1) 1-44,
38
7ibid p32
8 [1994] 3 All ER 79
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was placed9 at the time of the act or omission in question suggests that the 
judiciary are wary of the possibility of scapegoating. Such considerations, in the 
context of a corporate defendant, would involve an examination of corporate 
policies and standard operating procedures. The courts would be forced to 
examine the corporate culture for signs of negligent operation, in order to 
determine whether an employee would be found guilty, thereby opening the 
way for a corporate conviction under the identification principle. The awareness 
of all the circumstances in which the 'hands' of a corporation can be placed by 
the decisions of the 'brain' is evident of a movement away from parasitic 
liability; a recognition that there may be cases in which no individual is 
sufficiently at fault, but the operation of the corporate enterprise is criminally 
negligent.
The mention above of implied corporate policy indicates the importance of 
looking beyond the public image of a company at the unwritten rules and 
practices which govern its everyday operation. It is never likely that a policy of 
non-compliance will emerge from scrutiny of public company documents; rather 
it is something which must be uncovered from evidence of how a corporation is 
run - were production schedules, for example, too demanding to be met without 
compromising safety? How receptive was management to suggestions for 
improvements to procedure? Did superiors ask for the accomplishment of tasks 
and not require details of the methods used? The prosecution of serious offences 
must involve an examination of these and similar questions, or the possibility of 
rehabilitating companies found to be operating unsafely will be lost.
The Law Commission's proposed offence of corporate killing and sanction of 
court-ordered remedial action shows an encouraging willingness to move
9 ibid p87
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towards a new system of liability which does not require the culpability of an 
individual corporate officer. The Report does, however, show a reluctance to 
consider the corporation as a real, if legal, 'person'; there is still a reliance on the 
idea of the corporation's 'fictional' personality. In keeping with the ability 
described above to ascribe negligence, knowledge, recklessness and intention to 
corporations, there is no difficulty in accepting corporations as genuine, not 
fictional, actors in the modern world. Hence, the denial of corporate 'capacity' to 
appreciate risk in the Law Commission Report is disappointing, and prevents the 
corporate offence from mirroring the individual offence of killing by gross 
carelessness; if this had been the case, the potential marginalisation of the 
corporate offence could have been limited.
The concept of 'management failure' detailed in the Law Commission Report is 
highly welcome, and is positive because, like the Australian provisions, its focus 
is on corporate rather than individual fault. This focus on management failure 
and the potential outlined in the Law Commission Report for remedial action 
orders shows that rehabilitation is an important justification underlying the 
prosecution and punishment of corporations. Similarly, the ability to fine 
corporations shows that deterrence and retribution both play an important part 
in the philosophy of corporate punishment, as well as a wish to adequately 
express the social unacceptability of corporate crime. As explained in this paper, 
cash fines are not the most effective way of achieving these ends, and should be 
replaced by the introduction of stock dilution fines. Public censure could also be 
furthered by the use of adverse publicity, and community service and corporate 
probation (as approved by the Law Commission) should be added to the list of 
available sanctions against corporate criminals.
The problem of corporate crime is only likely to increase in an ever more 
technical society. The language we use to describe such activity is, however.
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increasingly the language of blame and censure, and the concept of corporate 
criminality is no longer a fanciful idea to the layman. A break must be made 
from the organic development of corporate liability along principles of vicarious 
liability and its subset, the alter ego approach. Corporate crime deserves 
investigation of corporate fault, and punishment which can achieve improvement 
of discovered management failure. Only in this way will the law end its futile 
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